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Abstract 
Essay1: For more than a decade, to reduce the agency problem, various ways have been 
examined on how to align the interest of manager with shareholders. Evidence and empirical 
findings are conflicting on the agency problem. Recently, deferred compensation as one 
incentive compensation draws the attention as a means to incentivize CEOs to make them 
work for the firm. However, it is still not evident if deferred compensation has effect on 
aligning CEOs with the firm’s goal possibly due to the issue on data. Therefore, the first 
essay investigates if deferred compensation has the effect on the agency problem and on the 
firm performance improvement after dealing with the data issue. This paper mainly aims to 
investigate if there is the non-linear relationship between the investment choice problem and 
the deferred compensation as Jensen and Meckling (1976) claim. This paper concludes that 
deferred compensation from NQDC table has positive and significant effect on the firm 
performance and the investment choice problem. More importantly, following McConnell 
and Servaes (1990), this paper finds the curvilinear relationship between Tobin’s Q and the 
deferred compensation and can confirm Jensen and Meckling (1976) theoretical application.  
 
The second essay aims to clarify the understanding on the relationship between the firm’s 
cash holdings and its causes by introducing the more detailed relationship between cash 
holdings and macroeconomic uncertainty. While previous literature tries to explain the level 
of cash holdings mainly by the firm-level variables, this study considers the full impact of the 
macroeconomic uncertainty on the level of cash holdings by introducing the firm’s 
heterogeneous exposure to macroeconomic uncertainty to see if the heterogeneity can tell the 
difference in the change in the level of cash holdings. This paper finds that macroeconomic 
uncertainties measured by difference macroeconomic condition variables are significant and 
contribute to the change in cash holdings. Additionally, this paper shows that the firms’ 
different level of exposure to macroeconomic uncertainty can cause the different degree of 
cash holdings and that firms with the higher level of exposure have the higher level of cash 
holdings.  
 
 
 
 
 
Keywords: CEO compensation; Cash Holdings; Deferred compensation; Underinvestment; 
Macroeconomic uncertainty; Inside debt 
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Essay1: Deferred CEO Compensation and Firm Investment Decisions 
Introduction 
For a couple of decades, a number of literature researches have examined the principal-
agency problem. Among them, many have attempted to solve this agency problem by 
controlling motivations of CEOs, especially in large and publicly held firms, to make 
decisions synchronized with the shareholders’ wealth maximization. Hence, many researchers 
have aimed to examine the relation between the executive compensation and the firm’s 
performance because the executive compensation is believed the sure way to control CEO’s 
motivation. Smith and Watts (1992) argue that the larger the firm’s value by investment 
opportunities, the higher the CEO’s compensation because CEO’s investment skill is scarce 
resources and because the higher the firm is tied to intangible assets, the higher chance the 
CEO’s remuneration is tied to the firm’s value through compensation schemes. Baber et al 
(1996) extend Smith and Watts (1992) by investigating cross-sectional relation between 
investment opportunities and the sensitivity of executive compensation to the performance 
measures and find the strong and positive relation between the executive compensation and 
the firms’ performance, which conclude the removal of principal-agency problem by the 
compensation policy. Many additional studies suggest that equity such as stock option can 
align CEO’s incentive with the firm. Brickley and Hevert (1991) show that CEOs’ stock 
ownership can change CEOs to behave toward firm value maximization. Huselid (1995) 
concludes that asset turnover ratio and financial performance are better for firms using 
incentive compensation for CEOs. Collins et al (1995) examine the intra-industry changes in 
compensation policy over significant changes in investment opportunity set among large bank 
holding companies and conclude that the ratio of incentive compensation-to-total 
compensation, CEO’s relative leverage ratio, is positively related to the increases in 
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investment opportunities. Hence, studies on CEO compensation for the agency problem and 
the firm performance have concentrated on the positive impact of cash and equity incentive 
compensations. However, the opposite impact of CEO compensation should not be 
overlooked. Bizjak et al. (1993) show a negative association between incentive-intensity of 
CEO compensation and the firm’s investment opportunities. Using both of cash 
compensation and stock option awards, Yermack (1995) finds that no evidence regarding the 
positive relation between CEO compensation and investment opportunities. Hence, CEO 
compensation, especially equity incentive compensation, is designed to align CEOs to work 
for the firm but empirical findings suggest the impact of CEO compensation toward the firm 
performance and investment opportunities is not clear.  
On Jan. 16, 2013, Morgan Stanley announced that several thousand Morgan Stanley 
traders, investment bankers and other employees will get IOUs instead of cash when bonus 
day arrives. IOUs are the millions of dollars in the form of deferred compensation maily for 
top executives. After the 2007-2008 financial crises, top executive officers participate in 
benefit schemes under which executives delay the receipt of salary and bonus which, instead, 
will be invested back to the company for the certain terms and conditions in installed 
payment in the future. Hence, these forms of deferrals are also known as inside debt because 
these are fixed obligations of the companies to make future payments to CEOs. Generally, 
deferred compensation accrues when CEOs make their own investment decisions to lend the 
compensation back to companies by foregoing the cash and bonus compensation that they 
would otherwise receive in the pre-installed periods. Then, it is invested either at the fixed 
rate of return or in the form of mutual funds chosen by the companies. CEOs are allowed to 
change the plans in how deferred compensation is invested and how this deferred 
compensation is paid out to the executives at or until retirement, even though early paid-out 
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can be permitted under certain terms and conditions.  
  
 4 
 
Deferred Compensation 
Generally, according to the Deferred Compensation database and the requirements from 
the Financial Accounting Standard Board (FASB) No. 123 and Section 409A of the Internal 
Revenue Code (IRC)1, there are three categories in the deferred compensation. The first one 
is the registrant contributions. It is the additional amounts of contributions promised by the 
firm and which can be based on firm performance. The second one is the executive 
contributions which are the amount that the executive choose to elect to defer until retirement, 
rather than receive, out of annual compensation of the base salary and bonus. The last part of 
deferred compensation is the aggregate earnings on the deferred compensation balance. It is 
the above-market earnings on deferred compensation, which is due by the firm guaranteeing a 
fixed rate of return greater than the return that the executive could have received if the 
deferred compensation could have been instead invested in the other types of financial assets. 
These three types of deferred compensations are the main variables in this study and the 
major distinction from the previous researches on this topic. As is shown in Executive 
Compensation database, deferred compensation and pension values are combined together 
and considered as the inside debt for many researches. However, previous studies employ 
only the pension under the assertion that pension is the sole portion of deferred compensation 
to have incentive alignment effect. Sundaram and Yermack (2007) utilize only the pension to 
see its impact on the CEO’s decision making process. Anantharaman et al. (2011) 
disaggregate the total pension portion into two parts of tax qualified plan and Supplemental 
Executive Retirement Plan (SERP) and apply the SERP-base portion to investigate the effect 
to the cost of borrowing. Other studies such as Wei and Yermack (2011) and Lee and Tang 
                                           
1 Additionally, FASB ASC 710-10-25-9 requires that firms should report the executive contribution and the 
registrant contribution as the expenses in the income statement and as the liabilities in the balance sheet. 
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(2011) test both pension and deferred compensation. They introduce pension as a part of the 
inside debt, claiming that pension has the incentive alignment effect to decrease agency 
problem while deferred compensation is not thought so.  
However, deferred compensation does not have to meet the tax requirements unlike the 
qualified plans such as 401(k) hence can be non-tax-qualified. Also, for deferred 
compensation to be non-tax-qualified and consequently to be qualified for tax deferrals, 
deferred compensation should be unfunded, unsecured, and uninsured. So, the firm cannot 
prepare funds in a separated account for the deferred compensation to CEOs. Because each 
category of deferred compensation is unfunded and unsecured, it could be sufficient for the 
deferred compensation to work, with the pension excluded, to incentivize CEO as is claimed 
by Anantharaman et al. (2011) and Han and Pan (2015).2  
In addition to the unsecuredness and unfundedness of deferred compensation, the timing 
issue with deferred compensation can also explain the incentive effect. Section 409A of the 
IRC requires CEOs of firms to elect the portion of salary to defer prior to the beginning of the 
year when salary compensation is given and to elect the portion of bonus to defer at least six 
months before the end of the year when bonus compensation is given. Once the election of 
this deferred compensation is made, it cannot be changed or revoked, which eventually work 
as a powerful incentive for CEOs along with the fact that CEOs would have had to pay taxes 
for salary and bonus if they had been earned instead of having been deferred. After CEOs 
finalize the election of deferred compensation, firms need to decide whether or not to 
                                           
2 They argue that only pension, out of deferred compensation and pension, can work as the debt-like 
compensation to have the incentive alignment effect. Pension consists of two parts of broad-based tax-qualified 
plan and SERP. The former one is required to be funded and insured by the Pension Benefit Guarranty 
Corporations while SERP is unsecured and unfunded. Hence, SERP-based pension was applied into examining 
pension’s effect to cost of borrowing.  
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contribute and how much to deferred compensation. Firm contribution 3  to deferred 
compensation depends on the firm performance such as return on assets, return on equity, or 
stock returns and this performance-based contribution is made generally at the end of the year. 
Since firm contribution is the additional deferred compensation measured by the firm 
performance and is given to CEOs, it also can work as a powerful incentive for CEOs. In 
addition, firms offer CEOs additional deferred compensation with a guaranteed rate of return 
in the form of earnings on deferred balance. Since the guaranteed rate of return is often 
higher than the market rate outside the tax-advantaged 401(k) plan, this above-market and tax 
deferred rate of return surely can incentivize CEOs because the higher the guaranteed rate of 
return, the higher the gap between guaranteed rate of return and market return hence the 
higher the benefit to CEOs.  
Therefore, one certain advantage of deferred compensation is that it enables to decrease 
the investment choice problem by incentivizing CEOs. CEOs are less likely to engage in 
risky behavior if they know that the firm owes them big chunk of deferred compensation and 
if CEOs contribute their compensation to deferred compensation, which consequently works 
for the increase in reputation of the firm since CEOs are expected to be more prudent in 
investment.  
Additionally, since 2006, the Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 123 (FAS 
123R) and the SEC require companies to disclose the information on deferred compensation 
which the recently related research has used as the major dataset. But a great volume of 
research fails to define and utilize the relevant portion of deferred compensation, the portion 
which can actually affect the choice problem as Fulmer (2014) asserts. Previous literature 
                                           
3 It is the Registrant contribution in the Non-Qualified Deferred Compensation Tables (NQDC). To distinguish 
better among contributions, this paper uses firm contribution for registrant contribution 
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such as Ananthraman et al (2011) and Lee and Tang (2011) claims that only pension and the 
non-qualified deferred compensation in the total deferred compensation are the portion 
unsecured, unfunded, and ungaranteed. So, only CEOs who have this portion of deferred 
compensation in their package could have motivation to reduce the risk in investment choice 
and to avoid risky investments. CEOs who have qualified and insured deferred compensation 
as the major portion of their deferred compensation would have less incentive to avoid risky 
investments because their compensation will be paid out regardless of the success of 
investments they choose. What previous literature focuses on to measure the effect of the 
deferred compensation on the investment choice problem is the pension, not deferred 
compensation, even though pension is also required to be reported in Summary 
Compensation Table (SCT) as the part of total deferred compensation. Also, although 
literature claims that some proportion of deferred compensation is tax-qaulified so that 
portion should be disregarded for the investment choice problem, they fail to show how to 
disaggregate deferred compensation into qualified and non-qualified portions. 4  Hence, 
previous studies using pension or total deferred compensation as deferred compensation for 
testing on the investment choice problem is less relevant in terms of data application. This 
paper refines the relevant portion out of total deferred compensation to measure the more 
accurate effect on the investment choice problem. Three sub-categories of deferred 
compensation are non-qualified hence unfunded and uninsured. So, CEOs have sufficient 
incentive to maximize the shareholders’ wealth or firm valuation so as to make the deferred 
compensation paid back securely in the future such as at retirement. Plus, the timing issue 
with each category of deferred compensation can give CEOs more solid motivation to work 
                                           
4 Cassell et al. (2012) mention that CEO pension and deferred compensation are “generally” unfunded and 
unsecured.  
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for the firms. Thus, all elements of deferred compensation required by the SEC in the Non-
Qualified Deferred compensation Tables (NQDC), which are three sub-categories, are 
sufficiently refined portion of what will affect the investment choice problem. Pension and 
deferred compensation are required to be disclosed in the Summary Compensation Tables 
(SCT) but firms are not required to report firm contribution of deferred compensation and/or 
earnings on deferred compensation in the SCT, which can result in the possibility of the 
understatement in value in “Total Compensation” element in SCT as shown in Figure 1.5.5  
Figure 1.1. Underinvestment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
CEOs prefer deferred compensation to the other types of compensations because of some 
reasons such as tax benefit, higher rate of return, camouflage effect, and substitution effect. 
Firms can provide CEOs with non-tax-qualified deferred compensation to attract or to attain 
CEOs, especially those who are adversely affected by the compensation limit imposed by the 
IRS on the qualified compensation plans. Qualified compensation plans are tax-free until 
                                           
5 Fulmer (2014) asserts that, because of this understatement, firms would be able to hide some portion of 
deferred compensation and use it to offset the current compensation in bad years. Shareholders of firms should 
read the footnotes of the report and tables to see how total compensation is constructed so as to prevent any 
hidden compensation amount by managers. 
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payouts from the plan starts but have the limit at $200,000 of annual compensation as the 
basis to determine benefit under the qualified plan. However, unlike the qualified plans, 
deferred compensation is subject to taxation but firms pay for tax. So, CEOs can shift the tax 
burden onto the firm by having deferred compensation instead. Additionally, for the deferred 
compensation plan, firms offer higher rate of return than the market rate on the deferred 
compensation. Rate of return on deferred compensation is higher than market rate and fixed 
or guaranteed therefore is an absolutely a good incentive to CEOs. Although firms would not 
offer CEOs returns higher than market rate, rate of return on deferred compensation after 
accounting for the tax benefit would be higher than that on other plans hence is why CEO 
would prefer deferred compensation. Due to the possible outrage cost,6 CEO of a firm, 
especially with a weak board and a strong CEO, prefers to have the compensation in a way to 
hide large amount of compensation. It was 1992 that the SEC required firms to disclose the 
compensation in a standardized format. Therefore, firms shift large portion of total 
compensation to the other type of compensation items which are not required to report. Even 
after the new rule in 2006 on the compensation disclosure, there still is obscured 
compensation as deferred compensation because not all items of deferred compensation are 
required to report in the Summary Compensation Tables (SCT). And there is the difference 
between the total deferred compensation in SCT and that in NQDC Tables, which also proves 
that CEOs prefer deferred compensation to obscure total compensation. Bebchuk and Fried 
(2004) find that boards use retirement benefits and deferred compensation to hide large 
amount of compensation and also find that camouflage compensation plays significant role in 
designing compensation plans. Fulmer (2014) claims that firms use deferred compensation to 
                                           
6 According to Bebchuk and Fried (2004), outrage might cause embarrassment or reputational harm to CEOs 
and reduce shareholders’ willingness to support CEOs, especially for proxy contests or takeover bids and 
outrage cost is referred to as the cost associated with these negative reactions. 
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obscure total compensation from shareholders because firm (registrant) contributions in 
deferred compensation increase at the high outrage cost.  
CEOs may prefer deferred compensation to the other types of compensation because of the 
substitution effect. Gerakos (2007) finds that powerful CEOs substitute pension for other 
types of compensation. Fulmer (2014) finds the positive relationship between pay cuts and 
firms contribution and concludes that the pay cut due to the poor performance is substituted 
by the increase in firm contribution of deferred compensation, leading the offset of the 
reduction in annual compensation with the more deferred compensation.  
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Literature Research 
For more than a decade, there has been extensive research on the agency problem among 
which have focused on the role of debt-like CEO compensation as a tool to motivate CEOs to 
align them to work for the firm’s goal. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that debt-like 
compensation works as a potential method for decreasing the principal-agency problem in 
leveraged companies. Matching CEO’s incentive to the firm’s incentive using deferred 
compensation can fix the agency problem so that there would be less risky investment deals, 
because CEOs would be risk-averse at determining investment choices under their 
synchronized debt situation with firm’s debt structure, and there would be, consequently, less 
amount of significant financial loss by investment failures. Smith and Stulz (1985) and John 
and John (1993) document that because of the increased CEO’s ownership in stocks and 
stock options, option-based compensation can increase CEO’s incentive to implement the 
risky investment opportunities, indicating that aligning CEO’s incentive to the firm’s by debt-
like compensation would decrease CEO’s own interest to carry out these risky investments. 
They find that alignment of managerial incentives with shareholder interests and the 
managerial compensation in a leveraged firm serve as a device to reduce investing in risky 
projects and to minimize the agency costs. Lewellen (2006) supports the claim by providing 
the empirical evidence. Coles et al. (2006) also supports by empirically testing a strong 
relation between the structure of managerial compensation and value-critical managerial 
decisions, especially from investment policy and debt policy. They find that higher vega, the 
sensitivity of CEO wealth to stock volatility, implements riskier policy choices, which 
provides supportive evidence for the hypothesis that CEO would have less incentive to invest 
in riskier assets and to become aggressive in debt policy when the compensation structure is 
less dominated by stocks. Sundaram and Yermack (2007) claim to initiate the valuation and 
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incentive effects of inside debts such as pensions and deferred compensation which have 
been almost overlooked and find that high debt incentive CEOs can manage firms 
conservatively. What this paper finds are specifically that pensions accounts for a significant 
portion of all compensations, that compensation becomes pension-biased as CEO grows older, 
and that CEO with high debt-biased compensation manage firms conservatively, especially in 
project selection, to reduce default risk. Gerakos (2007) provides evidence that firms use 
deferred compensation plans to reduce the principal-agency cost of debt in the capital 
structure, concluding that higher pension values is associated with lower idiosyncratic risk of 
the firm. Edmans and Liu (2011) follow Jensen and Meckling (1976) by concluding that the 
higher the CEO’s inside debt leverage ratio to firm debt leverage, the lesser the degree to 
which CEOs engage in risky investments, resulting in the detriment to bondholders.7 Lee and 
Tang (2011) use the non-qualified pension and deferred compensation from total deferred 
compensation and conclude that the higher the CEO’s inside debt/equity ratio, the lower the 
chance that the firm engages in risky policy choices and the lower the firm’s risk by showing 
that CEO compensation has a higher balance of inside debt as the probability of bankruptcy 
increases. Cassell et al (2012) argue that CEO inside debt is unsecured and unfunded 
liabilities so CEO is exposed to the default risk. They investigate if the theory that CEOs with 
large inside debt will show low degree of risk seeking behavior and find a negative 
association between CEO inside debt holdings and the volatility of future firm stock returns, 
R&D expenditures, and financial leverage, suggesting that CEOs with large inside debt 
holdings prefer less risky investment and financial policies. 
However, increased/accumulated deferred compensation may adversely cause the 
                                           
7 Edmans and Liu (2011) test if inside debt is related with firm’s default risk and conclude that firms under 
financial distress tend to issue more debt-like compensation to CEOs to induce CEOs but make CEOs to be 
passive in project selection. Therefore, firms cannot generate sufficient profit to remove financial distress and to 
pay back to bondholders. 
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detriment to firm valuation. Excessive deferred compensation to CEOs could lead the adverse 
problem, the underinvestment. Jensen and Meckling (1976) document that CEOs tend to pose 
too conservatively at the investment decision making process if CEO’s debt-like 
compensation holding exceed the overall external debt structure of the firm in terms of ratio, 
even though overall firm’s risk would reduce by a way of transferring wealth from 
shareholders to bondholders due to CEO’s risk-averse attitude. Wei and Yermack (2010) 
study the stockholder/bondholder reaction to initial report on the CEO inside debt and 
conclude that the bond price increases and stock price decreases. Conclusively, there is the 
destruction of firm value when a CEO’s deferred compensation is realized and deferred 
holdings become large. Hakenes and Schnabel (2010) investigate if bonus compensation may 
arise endogenously as the response to the agency problem in the banking industry and 
conclude that CEO’s unlimited debt or liability can be counterproductive, indicating that a 
stronger alignment of interests between the CEO and the firm destabilizes especially when 
shareholders of a bank have strong risk-taking incentives. Qiu (2012) adopts the Merton 
(1974) model to investigate the underinvestment and the overinvestment problem determined 
by the net present value of projects when inside debt is used for firms with the CEO who has 
more equity-incentive compensation than debt-incentive compensation (equity-biased) and 
with the CEO who has more debt-incentive than equity-incentive (debt-biased) in CEO 
compensation and concludes that firms with the equity-biased CEO seem to improve the 
project choice problem as inside debt increases, while firms with the debt-biased CEO seem 
to trigger more project choice problem as inside debt increases. Conclusively, it indicates that 
inside debt could cause the project choice problem if inside debt continues to increase. 
Eisdorfer et al (2013) argues that the gap between the CEO’s leverage ratio and the firm’s 
leverage ratio can have impact on the firm’s decision making process. This paper finds that 
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there are more distortions in investment as the gap becomes larger. When CEOs have more 
debt-like compensation by receiving more inside debt, CEOs tend to show underinvestment 
while CEOs with more equity-like compensation tend to show overinvestment. Consistent 
with Eisdorfer et al (2013), Liu et al (2013) explain the indirect relation between deferred 
compensation and the investment choice problem by showing the positive relation between 
deferred compensation and corporate cash holdings. This paper finds that the level of firm’s 
cash holdings rises as inside debt increases and suggests that inside debt can harm 
shareholder value by having excess cash holdings. Findings of this paper support that CEOs 
become passive in project choice as CEOs inside debt increases hence eventually increases 
the level of cash holdings inside the firm and underinvestment problem may rise.  
Therefore, while the theoretical implication of deferred compensation as shown in Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) is clear, whether this deferred compensation actually raises CEO’s 
motivation hence can effectively resolve the investment choice problem is undetermined. 
Also, much previous research has paid attention mainly to find the relationship between 
deferred compensation and the investment choice problem such as underinvestment or 
overinvestment. Others have aimed to provide evidence of the effect of deferred 
compensation toward the investment choice problem. However, these findings are one-side 
conclusion such as the existence of the underinvestment problem, unlike the implication from 
the theory such as in Jensen and Meckling (1976) which argue the improvement in choice 
problem but then the impairment in choice problem as deferred compensation increases.  
 15 
 
Contribution to Literature 
This paper aims to manifest the effect of deferred compensation on the investment choice 
problem by checking if the investment choice problem is reduced as deferred compensation 
increases and if the investment choice problem increases as deferred compensation increases 
more than the optimal level8. But as claimed from the theory, if CEOs have more deferred 
compensation than firm’s optimal level, they may tend to pose too conservative in managing 
the firm. It is the first contribution of this paper to the literature to test the possible non-linear 
behavior of the investment choice problem as the deferred compensation changes as shown in 
Figure 1.2. While firms are required to report all items of deferred compensation in NQDC 
table, they are not obligated to disclose the firm contribution and earmings from deferred 
compensation, both of which are the main portion of total deferred compensation, in SCT. So 
there is the understatement issue because total deferred compensation in SCT differs from 
that in NQDC table. Due to this understatement issue in deferred compensation values in SCT, 
it should be avoided to apply the pension and deferred compensation reported in the SCT, 
which previous researches employ to their empirical studies, into the analysis of the effect on 
the investment choice problem. It is another contribution to the literature to utilize the refined 
deferred compensation for the investment choice problem, unlike the previous studies.  
Furthermore, this study plans to investigate the effect of deferred compensation toward the 
firm value. There have been a number of literature that advocate the relationship between the 
CEO compensation and the firm value or performance. Jensen and Murphy (1990) claim that 
CEO compensation should be bestowed as the rewards of the positive performance but 
should be deprived due to the poor performance by CEOs. Fulmer et al. (2014) argue that 
                                           
8 In this research, the optimal level is determined as the industry median of deferred compensation. When a firm 
confers the deferred compensation more than the industry median, the CEO in the firm is assumed to have 
excessive deferred compensation.  
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there is the ex-post settling up by firms to adjust the firm contribution of deferred 
compensation in accordance with the firm performance by CEOs. They prove empirically that 
firm contribution of deferred compensation tends to increase when there is the positive firm 
performance while cannot find evidence of the decrease in firm contribution by the poor firm 
performance. However, these argument and findings may not be able to explain causal 
relation of the increase in deferred compensation toward the increase in firm value or 
performance as shown in the event that Morgan Stanley’s announcement on increase in 
deferred compensation enhances firm’s reputation and may make the stock price to increase. 
Wei and Yermack (2010) study the reponse from the market on the disclosure of inside debt, 
which is the combination of pension and deferred compensation, by investing the relationship 
between the change in pension and deferred compensation and the change in equity prices 
and find that the disclosure causes bond price to fall and stock price to rise. This paper plans 
to go one step further by attempting to explain the change in firm value/performance due to 
the refined deferred compensation excluding pension, through investment choice problem of 
under- or over-investment. In that, this research tests if the refined deferred compensation 
would cause the investment choice problem and consequently casue the change in firm 
value/performance.  
Also, this paper examines the investment choice problem which can be due from the 
information asymmetry. Growth firms are expected to have a higher degree of information 
asymmetry between the management and shareholders than non-growth firms have. To 
reduce this problem, growth firms emphasize incentive compensation. (Smith and Watts 
(1992), Bizjak et al (1993), and Gaver and Gaver (1995)) Hence, it is testable if firms, 
especially growth firms, with a high information asymmetry can reduce the choice problem 
by deferred compensation because deferred compensation is one type of incentive 
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compensation to the CEOs.  
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: Following the Introduction section, 
hypothesis to test are presented in section 2. Data is described in section 3 where the sample 
data selection and the description and measurements for deferred compensation, the 
investment choice problem, and variables in the test are explained. In section 4, the test 
designs are provided in detail.  
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Hypothesis  
The primary focus of this research is on the less well-explored hypothesis that the CEO’s 
deferred compensation will affect investment choice problem by syncronizing CEO’s 
incentive with firm’s incentive.  
Figure 1.2. Investment Choice Problem vs. Deferred Compensation 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2 shows the description on the causal relationship between the firm’s tendency 
toward the investment choice and the deferred compensation to CEOs. When a firm tends to 
overinvest on investment projects, the overinvestment may tend to decrease if deferred 
compensation is given to CEOs because CEOs will be more sincere and cautious to selecting 
investment projects. If a firm tends to underinvest on investment projects, this 
underinvestment problem can also be reduced if deferred compensation is given because 
CEOs’ incentives are synchronized with firms’ incentives. They will make the most of the 
opportunity to make profits therefore many investment projects with positive NPVs could 
rather be accepted than being rejected. Reducing overinvestment and underinvestment, this 
deferred compensation would enhance the investment choice problem and the firm valuation: 
firm value enhancement by CEOs who become more sincere in choosing investment projects 
and undertaking more less-risky investment deals. However, as more deferred compensation 
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or excessive amount of deferred compensation is given to CEOs, deferred compensation 
would turn the CEOs to be more conservative so as to be more risk-averse in investment 
choices. Excessive deferred compensation will force CEOs with overinvestment tendency to 
be intimidated in investment, to be more risk-averse, and consequently to decrease the 
investments. Also, excessive compensation will pull down CEOs’ willingness, because of the 
increase in risk averseness, to invest more and well to become profitable in investment so it 
will cause more underinvestment to CEOs with underinvestment tendency. Therefore, 
excessive deferred compensation is expected to be related with the deeper underinvestment 
problem then could cause the decrease in firm reputation and valuation: firm value 
deterioration by CEOs who become more intimidated in management and decline valuable 
investment opportunities. The first hypothesis to test is as follows. Conclusively,  
 
Hypothesis 1: The more the deferred compensation is granted, the higher the improvement 
in investment choice problem and the higher the firm value.  
 
Hypothesis 2: The higher the deferred compensation excessively, the higher the chance of 
the underinvestment and of the deterioration of firm value.  
 
The third subject to test is regarding the growth firm. Growth firms tend to have a high 
degree of information asymmetry hence emphasize incentive compensation to reduce the 
agency problem associated with information asymmetry. Consistently, Gaver and Gaver 
(1995) find that CEOs in growth firms tend to have a larger incentive compensation in 
percentage than CEOs in non-growth firms have. Also, most of the incentive compensation is 
long-term contracts. Shareholders of growth firms and growth firms themselves seem to deal 
 20 
 
with the information asymmetry and the investment choice problem by aligning CEO’s 
interest with firm’s interest, bestowing more incentive compensation. By the characterisitcs 
and the timing issues, deferred compensation can work as the incentive compensation. Hence, 
it is expected that deferred compensation may be able to reduce the information asymmetry 
and the investment choice problem for growth firms more than it can do for the non-growth 
firms.  
 
Hypothesis 3: Deferred compensation could improve the investment choice problem for 
growth firms where a high level of information asymmetry is expected to cause the choice 
problem more than for non- or less-growth firms. 
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Data and Methodology 
Sample Data Selection  
Until 2006, CEO’s deferred compensation value is almost never disclosed under the SEC’s 
CEO compensation reporting requirements. Also Sundaram and Yermack (2007) argue that 
since the disclosed value data along with information from external sources and the actuarial 
computations are required to calculate the NPV of the CEO’s deferred compensation, it is not 
easy to gather this type of information even by Wall Street analysts. Even, there has been less 
disclosed information on other deferred compensation (ODC).9 However, on August 29, 
2006, the SEC’s new disclosure regulations became effective to include CEO compensation 
information in proxy statements, requiring the disclosure of all arranged information on the 
present value of compensation benefits accrued and accumulated under deferred 
compensation plans. Hence, this renewed rule for the information disclosure enables to gather 
considerably large sample data on the deferred compensation only for 2006 and after. Three 
components of deferred compensation are required to be reported in the NQDC of Deferred 
Compensation dataset while these deferred compensation components are not required to be 
reported in SCT of Execucomp Annual Compensation dataset. In that, firms are not required 
to disclose the firm contribution and/or earnings on deferred compensation in the SCT. Hence, 
the total compensation in SCT can be understated. To investigate the effect of deferred 
compensation to the investment choice problem, NQDC table is applied while SCT table is 
applied for the withdrawls of deferred compensation since information on the withdrawls is 
in SCT table.  
                                           
9 Firms are not obligated to report whether or not top managers participate in the deferred compensation plan. 
They have to report only when managers will receive a fixed rate of interest income on the deferred 
compensation plan if managers’ fixed rate is greater than the applicable federal rate. Also, firms are required to 
release only annual pension benefits payable at retirement and years of services, not the actuarial present value 
of total accumulated compensation benefits.  
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Sample data for firm characteristics is collected from the Compustat with the December 
fiscal year ending. Sample data for current and incentive compensation is collected from the 
Execucomp Compensation dataset and sample for deferred compensation items and pension 
is from Deferred Compensation dataset. Since it is reasonable to consider that the former 
change in or the occurrence of the deferred compensation will affect the CEO’s attitude 
measured by the underinvestment, at least two year data is required. Hence, after the release 
of the SEC’s new regulation, data spans from 2006 to 2012 in the annual basis. A couple of 
exclusions are applied. As R&D expenditure is applied to calculate the growth opportunities 
for firms, financial service operations industry (SIC codes 6000 – 6999) and regulated 
utilities firms (SIC codes 4910 – 4949) are excluded. Firms with faulty or incomplete 
executive compensation reports are discarded. Collected sample data is winsorized at 1% and 
99% to control for outliers. 
Description on Variables 
The objective of this paper is to investigate if the effect of the alignment of the CEO’s 
incentive with firm’s incentive would cause the investment choice problem of the over- or 
underinvestment due to the risk-averseness in CEO’s attitude and consequently the firm 
performance. Therefore, the dependent variable to test is the firm performance/investment 
opportunity measured by Tobin’s Q (Q). The deferred compensation consists of three 
components: registrant contribution (FIRM), executive contribution (EXEC), and earnings on 
deferred compensation (ENGS). The other compensations are current compensation (Current), 
incentive compensation (Incent) and total pension compensation (Pension). Following 
McConaughy and Mishra (1997) and Frye (2004), firm-level variables are applied as follows: 
Growth opportunity (MB), firm size (SIZE), dividend yield (DYLD), leverage (LEV), asset in 
place for capital incentive (AIP) and business risk (BR).  
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Measurements of Variables 
The most commonly used proxy for the firm performance and the investment opportunity 
is Tobin’s Q. Tobin’s Q is estimated as the sum of market value of common stock, long-term 
debt, short-term debt and preferred stock divided by total assets, followed by Chung and 
Pruitt (1994) and Frye (2004) approximation of Tobin’s Q. Deferred compensation is 
measured as the ratio to the sum of all compensation items. FIRM is the ratio of the total 
registrant contributions to deferred compensatin plan to the total compensation, EXEC the 
ratio of the total executive contributions to deferred compensation plan to the total 
compensation, and ENGS the ratio of the aggregate earnings in deferred earnings in deferred 
compensation plan to the total compensation. The total deferred compensation (TDC) is the 
sum of three components in deferred compensation, FIRM, EXEC, and ENGS. These four 
measurements are computed using NQDC table in Deferred Compensation dataset while the 
other explanatory variables for the effect of CEO compensation, Current, Incent, and Pension, 
are computed using SCT in Execucomp Annual Compensation dataset. Current compensation 
is the sum of salary and bonus compensation and incentive compensation is the sum of non-
equity incentive compensation plan, stocks awarded, and stock option in Black-Scholes 
valuation. Pension compensation is the present value of pension benefit. Then, each 
compensation is divided respectively by total compensation to have a ratio. To explain and 
control for the effect on the firm performance, firm-level variables are measured. Growth 
opportunities cannot be observed directly so should be measured by a proxy. Gay and Nam 
(1998) claim that the use of R&D expenditure is justified as a predictor of the development of 
the growth in the future. Growth opportunity (MB) is measured as a ratio of R&D expenditure 
to total sales. Using this measurement for growth opportunity, growth firms are assumed to 
have higher MB ratio than the industry median (M). Firm size (SIZE) is measured by the 
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logarithm of sales. Firm’s leverage condition (LEV) is measured as the ratio of short-term and 
long-term debt to total asset. Dividend yield (DYLD) is the dividend payout divided by 
common stock share price. Asset in place (AIP) is the ratio of inventory, gross plant and 
equipment to total assets. Since firm performance or the investment choice decision can be 
affected by the observed risk, business risk is introduced. Business risk (BR) is the standard 
deviation of percentage change in operating income, EBIT, as a proxy.  
Methodology 
Agency theory asserts that CEOs with incentive-based compensation should perform 
better because CEO’s interest is aligned with the firm’s interest. However, as claimed by 
Jensen and Meckling (1976), deferred compensation as the incentive-based compensation 
makes CEOs to be more risk-averse so that the investment choice problem increases and the 
firm performance declines. Using three different deferred compensations, this paper seeks to 
determine if deferred compensation given firm-level control variables as well as the other 
types of compensations can influence the firm performance and the investment choice 
problem. This primary model tests the impact of deferred compensation to the performance of 
the firm. Therefore, for example, it is to test how much in firm performance can be explained 
by the deferred compensation for the firm and how much can be done so by the other types of 
compensations. Using the mixed model regression methodology, the primary model is as 
below.  
𝑄 = 𝛽0,𝑡 + 𝛽1,𝑡𝑇𝐷𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2,𝑡𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽3,𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4,𝑡𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 
,where 𝑄 is the performance of the firm i at time t, measured by Tobin’s Q 
𝑇𝐷𝐶𝑖,𝑡 is the ratio of total deferred compensation to total compensation for the 
firm i at time t. Three measures of registrant contribution (FIRM), executive 
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compensation (EXEC), and earnings on deferred compensation (ENGS) are 
applied to compute the total deferred compensation. 
𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 is the ratio of the sum of salary and bonus to total compensation for 
firm i at time t.  
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 is the ratio of the sum of non-equity incentive plan compensation, stock 
awarded and stock options in Black Scholes valuation to total compensation 
for firm i at time t.  
𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡  is the ratio of the present value of pension benefit plan to total 
compensation for firm i at time t.  
𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑖,𝑡 are MB, SIZE, LEV, AIP, BR, and DYLD for firm i at time t. 
Each compensation component is respectively applied to a model to investigate the effect 
of each component to the firm performance and also combinations of compensation 
components such as current and incentive compensations are tested to figure out the 
combined effect on the firm performance. Since CEOs are normally rewarded with more than 
two different compensations, combination of compensation components should be tested. The 
variable of interest is TDC and its coefficient is expected positive and significant. However, 
the primary model cannot detect the existence of curvilinear relationship between Q and 
deferred compensation. Therefore, deferred compensation squared (TDC2) is computed and 
applied to the regression models to find the existence of the curvilinear relationship between 
Q and deferred compensation. Using the regressional results, inflection points are estimated 
to check CEO’s attitude toward the investment choice problem and to see if that attitude 
changes as a CEO is awarded different components of compensations. Therefore, the 
secondary and main model is as below.  
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𝑄 = 𝛽0,𝑡 + 𝛽1,𝑡𝑇𝐷𝐶𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽2,𝑡𝑇𝐷𝐶𝑖,𝑡
2 + 𝛽3,𝑡𝐶𝑢𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽4,𝑡𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡 + 𝛽5,𝑡𝑃𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡
+ 𝛽𝑡𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 
In the first step, only deferred compensation and its squared are regressed against Q to find 
the existence of the curvilinear relationship. Then, the other compensation components are 
added as additional variables to see whether the curvilinear relationship is changed or shifted. 
Since control variables are determinants of the firm performance, control variables are 
applied as additional variables to detect the possible chance in the curvilinear relationship 
between Q and the deferred compensation.  
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Empirical Test Result 
Table 1.1 presents the descriptive summary statistics for control variables, compensation 
variables as well as the dependent variable, Tobin’s Q. From Q to DYLD, variables are firm 
level variables in ratio. Variables are in $ from current and total compensation. Current is the 
sum of cash and bonus compensation. Incentive is the non-equity compensation and the stock 
option. Pension is the total pension compensation. Deferred is the sum of three items of 
deferred compensations which are listed below. Three items are portions of contribution by 
the registrant (firm) and the executive, respectively. Earnings is the earnings from the 
deferred compensation. The last section of summary statistics is the ratio of compensation to 
the total compensation. Since 2006 firms are required to report the pension and deferred 
contribution along with the other compensations. It shows that the sum of pension and 
deferred compensation accounts for large portion of a CEO’s compensation package. 
Approximately 40% of total compensation is accounted for by the sum of pension and 
deferred compensation, so called “inside debt”. On the contrary, CEO’s salary and bonus 
comprises 19% of the total compensation and figure 1.3 and 1.4 show that current portion has 
been decreasing since 1992 when firms are required to show compensation in a standardized 
format. Current compensation was 65% of the total compensation in 1992 and drastically 
decreases to 15% in 2012. Still, incentive compensation takes up the largest portion of the 
total compensation as mean of incentive compensation is 43%. However, figure 1.3 and 1.4 
show that incentive compensation also tends to decrease after having the largest portion in 
2000, especially after pension and deferred compensation have been reported since 2006. 
Mean of deferred compensation is still small as $955,000 (6.18%) but this study expects the 
deferred compensation to clarify the investment choice problem well. Approximately, 48% 
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Table 1.1. Descriptive Summary Statistics 
   
Firm variables and compensation in ratio are ratios and compensation variables dollar amount. Q is calculated as the sum of market value of common stock, long-term 
debt, short-term debt and preferred stock over total assets. BR is the business risk, the standard deviation of percentage change in EBIT. MB is growth opportunity, R&D 
expenditure over total sales. AIP is asset-in-place, the ratio of inventory, gross plant and equipment to total assets. LEV is the short-term and long-term debt to total asset. 
Size is the logarithm of sales. DYLD is the dividend payout over common stock share price. Data spans from 2006 to 2012 and is annual basis.  
Descriptive Summary Statistics 
      Variable N Mean Std Dev Minimum Maximum 
Firm Variables 
     
    Q 5039 1.9642 1.2998 0.0443 21.7591 
    BR 5039 5.6645 31.9305 0.0148 691.2557 
    MB 5039 0.1487 1.6976 0 85.0700 
    AIP 5039 0.5735 0.3794 0 2.8242 
    LEV 5039 0.4846 0.3256 0.0328 12.8765 
    SIZE 5039 7.1896 1.6795 0.0667 12.7100 
    DYLD 5039 0.0104 0.0557 0.0000 1.6742 
      Compensation Variables  
    
    Current 5039 2959.75 2072.93 184.23 27684.51 
    Incentive 5039 6594.13 11913.43 0.00 432176.62 
    Pension 5039 4959.95 13102.77 0.00 181340.47 
    Deferred 5039 955.30 3580.85 0.00 86142.87 
        Firm Contribution 5039 159.31 1610.53 0.00 85871.46 
        Exec. Contribution 5039 367.88 1624.05 0.00 37289.60 
        Earnings 5039 428.11 1825.75 0.00 41490.75 
    Total Compensation 5039 15469.12 23286.42 184.23 436484.39 
      Compensation in Ratio 
     
    Current 5039 0.1913 0.2762 0.0099 1.0000 
    Incentive 5039 0.4263 0.2405 0.00 0.9901 
    Pension 5039 0.3206 0.2330 0.00 0.9277 
    Deferred 5039 0.0618 0.0786 0.00 0.8567 
        Firm Contribution 5039 0.0103 0.0241 0.00 0.8540 
        Exec. Contribution 5039 0.0238 0.0407 0.00 0.5936 
        Earnings 5039 0.0277 0.0425 0.00 0.6063 
  
     
 29 
 
of firm’s assets are financed by liabilities and investment on the capital expenditure takes up 
57% of the total assets.  
Figure 1.3. Distribution of the Compensation by year 
 
 
Figure 1.4. Historical Distribution of the Compensation 
 
$0
$2,000,000
$4,000,000
$6,000,000
$8,000,000
$10,000,000
$12,000,000
$14,000,000
$16,000,000
TotalComp
Defer
Current
Pension
Incentive
Distribution of the Compensation by year ($)
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
100%
P
e
r
c
e
n
t 
(%
)
Year
Historical Distribution of the Compensation (%)
Incentive
Current
Pension
Defer
 30 
 
To find out the relationship among variables, correlations among variables are investigated. 
Table 1.2 presents the Pearson Correlation Coefficients. While the two exiting compensations, 
both current and incentive compensations, don’t seem to have correlation with the firm 
performance, the variable of interest, deferred compensation, is positively associated with the 
Tobin’s Q and the relationship is significant. So, deferred compensation may incentivize CEOs 
to work for the firm hence to be able to improve firm performance. Additionally, deferred 
compensation is negatively correlated with AIP, implying that deferred compensation may 
control CEOs not to take risk investments, which is consistent with Lee et al. (2016) and the 
hypothesis on this study. However, pension does not seem to align CEO’s incentive to work to 
improve firm performance as pension is negatively correlated with the Tobin’s Q.  
Before investigating the curvilinear relationship between the deferred compensation and the 
firm performance, this study examines the analysis of the relationship between the firm 
performance and CEO compensation as well as with firm-level control variables. Table 1.3 
reports the test results from the panel regressions. Panel A is the test result for the time period 
from 1992 to 2005 (before-2006) during which firms are not required to report pension and 
deferred compensation. Hence, the only compensation items applied to find out the effect on the 
firm performance are current and incentive compensations. R2 of models for before-2006 in 
column (1) and (2) are smaller than R2 of the same models for after-2006 period are 6.705% and 
6.636% in panel B, respectively. Hence, current and incentive compensations may not be able to 
sufficiently explain the investment choice problem although coefficients for current and 
incentive for before-2006 period are statistically significant. As more compensation items are 
required disclosed after 2006, the other items which have not been reported and considered   
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Table 1.2. Pearson Correlation Coefficients among Tobin’s Q and explanatory variables 
    
This table shows the result of Pearson Correlation Coefficients among Q and explanatory variables including control variables. Control variables are from BR to DYLD 
and compensation variables are from current to TDC. Current compensation is the ratio of the sum of cash and salary compensation to total compensation and incentive 
compensation is the ratio of the sum of non-equity incentive compensation, stock awarded, and stock options in Black-Scholes valuation to total compensation. Pension is 
the ratio of the total amount of pension in NQDC to total compensation and TDC is the ratio of the sum of firm contribution, executive contribution and earnings on 
deferred compensation to total compensation. Total compensation is the sum of current, incentive, pension, and deferred compensation. 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients  (P-value in parenthesis, Prob > |r|) 
             
 
Q BR MB AIP LEV SIZE DYLD Current Incentive Pension TDC 
            Q 1 
          
                        
BR -0.08947 1 
         
 
(0.0086) 
          
            MB 0.19184 -0.03372 1 
        
 
(<.0001) (0.3227) 
         
            AIP 0.0078 0.05651 -0.2515 1 
       
 
(0.8191) (0.0973) (<.0001) 
        
            LEV -0.05522 0.12641 -0.26051 0.12326 1 
      
 
(0.1052) (0.0002) (<.0001) (0.0003) 
       
            SIZE -0.07697 -0.10864 0.0993 -0.23242 0.06209 1 
     
 
(0.0238) (0.0014) (0.0035) (<.0001) (0.0684) 
      
            DYLD -0.10661 -0.0783 0.01967 0.06438 0.11597 0.32312 1 
    
 
(0.0017) (0.0215) (0.5641) (0.0588) (0.0006) (<.0001) 
     
            Current 0.05073 0.03172 -0.03575 0.05925 -0.06464 -0.28039 -0.13286 1 
   
 
(0.1367) (0.3523) (0.2944) (0.0821) (0.0578) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
    
            Incentive 0.04672 -0.0313 0.13824 -0.12784 -0.09105 0.0664 -0.13912 -0.19211 1 
  
 
(0.1706) (0.3587) (<.0001) (0.0002) (0.0075) (0.0513) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
   
            Pension -0.11751 -0.01079 -0.06787 0.06716 0.13427 0.1725 0.25088 -0.64867 -0.49136 1 
 
 
(0.0005) (0.7518) (0.0464) (0.0487) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
  
            TDC 0.16986 0.01939 0.00609 -0.09345 -0.0194 0.07 -0.04104 0.03494 0.1298 -0.20855 1 
 
(<.0001) (0.5698) (0.8583) (0.006) (0.5694) (0.0399) (0.2287) (0.3056) (0.0001) (<.0001) 
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Table 1.3 Panel A. Panel regression for before-2006 period 
This table shows the result of panel regression result of Tobin's Q 
on firm-level control variables and two compensations of Current 
and Incentive. Data spans from 1992 to 2005, before 2006 period. 
Column (1) is the result only with the current compensation ratio 
and (2) is that only with the incentive compensation ratio. 
Coefficients are shown and t-stat is in parenthesis.  
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
 
            
   
  
(1) (2) 
   
Variables 
        
Intercept 
 
5.6826 *** 4.4099 *** 
   
  
(41.77) (36.41) 
   
BR 
 
-0.0016 ** -0.0016 * 
   
  
(-1.88) (-1.89) 
   
MB 
 
0.0127 *** 0.0129 *** 
   
  
(3.26) (3.29) 
   
AIP 
 
-1.1053 *** -1.1428 *** 
   
  
(-13.73) (-14.18) 
   
LEV 
 
0.0152 
 
0.0158 
    
  
(0.75) (0.78) 
   
SIZE 
 
-0.2649 *** -0.2498 *** 
   
  
(-15.83) (-15.06) 
   
DYLD 
 
0.1207 
 
0.1188 
    
  
(1.14) (1.12) 
   
         
Compensation 
       
Current 
 
-1.2669 *** 
     
  
(-12.68) 
     
Incentive 
   
1.1274 *** 
   
    
(11.09) 
   
         
R2   5.872% 5.592% 
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before should be applied into the model to make up the incapability of current and incentive 
compensation for after-2006 period, which is one of the reasons that deferred compensation 
should be taken into account to explain the firm performance. 
Panel B shows the results for the panel regression tests with firm-level control variables and 
the compensation items. As shown from column (1) to (4) of panel B, current and incentive 
compensations are insignificant to explain the firm performance. Instead, pension and deferred 
compensation are found statistically significant. More importantly, deferred compensation shows 
a positive and significant relationship with the firm performance with the highest R2 among 4 
models, implying that deferred compensation should be considered to interpret the firm 
performance in the firm and that deferred compensation may work in favor of the firm by 
aligning CEO’s incentive with firm’s goal hence work to fix the investment choice problem 
when it is bestowed to the CEO. However, pension may not be a good tool to incentivize the 
CEO so as for them to work for the firm as there is a negative but significant association between 
pension and the firm performance. As normally more than one type of compensation are 
bestowed to the CEO, several different combinations of compensation packages are tested to see 
if any compensation package can explain the firm performance and can fix the investment choice 
problem. Test results are shown from column (5) to (10). None of compensations are found to be 
significant in explaining the firm performance and in fixing investment choice problem when 
they are given, with deferred compensation, to the CEO. However, deferred compensation 
sustains its positive significance to the firm performance, suggesting that the more deferred 
compensation bestowed to the CEO, the higher the firm performance and the more improvement 
in investment choice problem. Therefore, the test result is consistent with the first hypothesis. 
Column (11) is the test result for the full model with all four compensations. It shows that 
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incentive and pension are negatively significant and deferred compensation still maintains its 
positive significance to the firm performance. When a CEO is rewarded all four compensations, 
a firm could not expect that compensations will make the CEO work for the firm. Through all 
models, cash and bonus seems meaningless in explain the firm performance. Regarding firm-
level variables, firm’s leverage situation is the sole insignificant firm-level variable to the firm 
performance.  
Overall, table 1.4 suggests that firm performance enhances when deferred compensation is 
rewarded to a CEO and that current and incentive compensations which were significant before 
2006 when new regulation on compensation was released are no longer effective to explain the 
firm performance and the investment choice problem. Findings in table 1.4 confirms the first 
hypothesis that the more the deferred compensation is granted, the higher the improvement in 
investment choice problem and the higher the firm value with the positive relationship between 
deferred compensation and Tobin’s Q.  
As Jensen and Meckling (1976) claims that a CEO tends to behave too conservatively at the 
investment choice process if CEO’s debt-like compensation is higher than firm’s debt situation 
in ratio and the negative effect of deferred compensation on the firm performance and investment 
choice problem has been empirically tested and confirmed, both positive and negative effect of 
deferred compensation on the investment choice problem and the firm performance should be 
investigated since the positive effect of deferred compensation is manifested. To examine if there 
exist the curvilinear relationship between deferred compensation and the investment choice 
problem, Tobin’s Q is regressed against the deferred compensation and the deferred 
compensation squared. Table 1.4 shows coefficients for both variables and the inflection point.  
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Table 1.3 Panel B. Panel regression of Tobin’s Q  
 
This table shows the result of panel regression result of Tobin's Q on firm-level control variables. Combinations of compensations are applied to models. Data spans 
from 2006 to 2012 with annual basis. Column (1) to (4) shows the test result with each compensation. Column (5) to (10) shows the test result with possible 
combination of compensations. Last column is the test result for the full model. Coefficients are shown and t-stat is in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
Variables 
            
Intercept 
 
1.7371*** 1.7871*** 1.7979*** 1.6969*** 1.6517*** 1.7063*** 1.6986*** 1.6578*** 1.7233*** 1.7433*** 2.0514*** 
  
(8.35) (9.00) (9.32) (8.87) (8.05) (8.71) (8.89) (7.77) (8.01) (8.84) (7.14) 
BR 
 
-0.0070*** -0.0070*** -0.0070*** -0.0074*** -0.0074*** -0.0074*** -0.0074*** -0.0074*** -0.0073*** -0.0074*** -0.0074** 
  
(-3.08) (-3.07) (-3.08) (-3.29) (-3.29) (-3.29) (-3.28) (-3.29) (-3.27) (-3.30) (-3.31) 
MB 
 
3.3539*** 3.3223*** 3.2857*** 3.4089*** 3.4154*** 3.4215*** 3.3747*** 3.4210*** 3.3653*** 3.4195*** 3.4184*** 
  
(6.17) (6.08) (6.06) (6.38) (6.39) (6.37) (6.31) (6.36) (6.27) (6.37) (6.37) 
AIP 
 
0.1411 0.1433 0.1533* 0.1755** 0.1752** 0.1745** 0.1802** 0.1747** 0.1812** 0.1774** 0.1811** 
  
(1.61) (1.63) (1.75) (2.03) (2.03) (2.02) (2.09) (2.02) (2.09) (2.05) (2.10) 
LEV 
 
0.0967 0.0929 0.1169 0.1033 0.1072 0.1021 0.1165 0.1065 0.1167 0.1167 0.1186 
  
(0.72) (0.69) (0.87) (0.78) (0.81) (0.77) (0.88) (0.80) (0.88) (0.88) (0.89) 
SIZE 
 
-0.0292 -0.0340* -0.0282 -0.0405** -0.0376* -0.0402** -0.0374** -0.0376* -0.0384** -0.0346* -0.0387** 
  
(-1.49) (-1.78) (-1.48) (-2.17) (-1.95) (-2.14) (-1.98) (-1.95) (-1.99) (-1.81) (-1.99) 
DYLD 
 
-4.6346*** -4.5937*** -3.9718** -4.2419*** -4.2055*** -4.2958*** -3.8800** -4.2320*** -3.8372** -3.9851** -3.7945** 
  
(-2.91) (-2.85) (-2.45) (-2.70) (-2.68) (-2.70) (-2.43) (-2.66) (-2.39) (-2.49) (-2.36) 
             
Compensation 
          
Current 
 
0.0972 
   
0.0658 
  
0.0635 -0.0356 
 
-0.3225 
  
(0.89) 
   
(0.61) 
  
(0.57) (-0.25) 
 
(-1.47) 
Incentive 
  
0.0534 
   
-0.0303 
 
-0.0142 
 
-0.1413 -0.4068* 
   
(0.39) 
   
(-0.22) 
 
(-0.10) 
 
(-0.92) (-1.72) 
Pension 
   
-0.2298** 
   
-0.1225 
 
-0.1436 -0.1718 -0.4561** 
    
(-2.34) 
   
(-1.24) 
 
(-1.10) (-1.53) (-2.04) 
TDC 
    
1.4977*** 1.4889*** 1.5048*** 1.4242*** 1.4925*** 1.4163*** 1.4273*** 1.3617*** 
     
(5.47) (5.43) (5.46) (5.09) (5.40) (5.03) (5.10) (4.81) 
             
R2   6.705% 6.636% 7.213% 9.786% 9.825% 9.791% 9.947% 9.826% 9.953% 10.034% 10.266% 
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Table 1.4. Panel regression of Tobin’s Q for the existence of curvilinear relationship 
 
This table shows the result of panel regression result of Tobin's Q on compensation variables only to detect the non-linear relationship between Q and deferred 
compensation. Combinations of compensations are applied to models. Data spans from 2006 to 2012 with annual basis. TDC2 is the total deferred compensation 
squared. Column (1) is the test result with only TDC. Column (2) to (7) shows the test result with each compensation and with possible combination of compensations. 
Last column is the test result for the full model. Coefficients are shown and t-stat is in parenthesis. Inflection point is measured and presented to show the non-linear 
relationship between Q and the deferred compensation and the maximum point of Q. 
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
         
Intercept 
 
1.4950*** 1.4607*** 1.4659*** 1.5796*** 1.4136*** 1.6029*** 1.6152*** 1.8405*** 
  
(34.47) (28.26) (23.27) (27.52) (19.21) (17.71) (17.48) (8.38) 
Compensation 
        
TDC 
 
2.9574*** 2.9169*** 2.9212*** 2.7038*** 2.8586*** 2.6857*** 2.7053*** 2.6127*** 
  
(4.86) (4.79) (4.78) (4.38) (4.67) (4.33) (4.38) (4.19) 
TDC2 
 
-3.8603*** -3.7886*** -3.8280*** -3.5605*** -3.7312*** -3.5478*** -3.5531*** -3.4640** 
  
(-2.85) (-2.79) (-2.82) (-2.62) (-2.75) (-2.61) (-2.61) (-2.54) 
Current 
  
0.1296 
  
0.1493 -0.0470 
 
-0.2518 
   
(1.22) 
  
(1.37) (-0.33) 
 
(-1.13) 
Incentive 
   
0.0862 
 
0.1242 
 
-0.0757 -0.2885 
    
(0.64) 
 
(0.90) 
 
(-0.49) (-1.19) 
Pension 
    
-0.2189** 
 
-0.2472* -0.2451** -0.4701** 
     
(-2.24) 
 
(-1.91) (-2.21) (-2.06) 
          
Inflection Point 
 
46.144% 46.144% 46.144% 46.144% 46.144% 46.144% 46.144% 46.144% 
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Column (1) contains the basic model only with the deferred compensation and the deferred 
compensation squared. There is a positive and significant association between the deferred 
compensation and Tobin’s Q whereas the deferred compensation squared is negatively but 
significantly associated with Tobin’s Q. Therefore, there is strong evidence of a curvilinear 
relationship between the deferred compensation and Tobin’s Q. Firm performance increases then 
decreases as more deferred compensation is rewarded hence deferred compensation comprises 
larger portion of total compensation package. It also can be interpreted that the investment choice 
problem can be improved but then increase as deferred compensation increases. The curve 
reaches its maximum at 46.144% and the value of Tobin’s Q decreases after it hits the maximum 
point. Figure 1.5 presents the graphical explanation.  
Figure 1.5. Inflection Point for Column (1) and (4) 
 
 
This suggests that deferred compensation may incentivize CEOs to work for the firm and to 
decrease the investment choice problem but if deferred compensation becomes larger in the total 
CEO compensation, CEOs could be too conservative on choosing investment projects then the 
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investment choice problem could rise again. This is the main finding of this study and it is 
consistent with Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Qiu (2012) and confirms the second hypothesis 
that the higher the deferred compensation excessively, the higher the chance of the 
underinvestment and of the deterioration of firm value. From column (2) to (7), three different 
types of compensation items are introduced into the regression model as additional explanatory 
variables. In column (2), the additional measure is the current compensation, in (3) the incentive 
compensation, and in (4) pension. From (5) to (7), combination of three different types of 
compensations is introduced as additional measures. In any model, current and incentive 
compensation is not statistically significant hence fail to incentivize CEOs to work for the firm. 
However, pension has a negative and significant relationship with Tobin’s Q so it seems that 
pension may have the adverse effect on the firm performance or on fixing the investment choice 
problem as its coefficient is negative. It is consistent with Wei and Yermack (2010). In no case, 
the inclusion of the additional compensations does not change the inflection point. The inclusion 
of pension changes neither the maximum point of Tobin’s Q nor the shape of the curvilinear 
relationship. However, when pension is included, the maximum value of Tobin’s Q decreases by 
1.74% 10 from that in the basic model.  
Overall, it is clear that the coefficient of deferred compensation is positive and significant and 
that of deferred compensation squared is negative and significant. This finding can construct the 
curvilinear relationship between deferred compensation and Tobin’s Q, firm performance and 
this relationship is consistent with the hypothesis that deferred compensation can decrease the 
investment choice problem but later increase that problem as deferred compensation takes up 
                                           
10 Change in value of Tobin’s Q by inclusion or exclusion of compensation variables are provided upon request. 
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larger portion of total compensation. This finding can give an empirical support on Jensen and 
Meckling (1976). None of the other compensations are important to the firm performance or 
deferred compensation as current and incentive compensation are not significant and pension is 
negatively related.  
Table 1.5 presents the results of the analysis to deals with one concern that the significant 
curvilinear relationship between deferred compensation and Tobin’s Q is a spurious correlation 
between Tobin’s Q and deferred compensation and a confounding variable. To check the 
spurious correlation and to determine if the curvilinear relationship could change by the 
inclusion of the additional variables which are known as determinants of Tobin’s Q.11 Even with 
the inclusion of control variables into the regressions, it seems that the curvilinear relationship 
between Tobin’s Q and deferred compensation remains still valid. Coefficient of deferred 
compensation is positive and significant and that of deferred compensation squared is negative 
and significant, which indicates that the curvilinear relationship is the inverse U shape as is 
found in table 1.4. Inflection point of each model remains unchanged as 46.144% from inflection 
point of the corresponding model in table 1.4. However, the maximum value of the inflection 
point in column (1) increases by 1.12% from that in basic model of table 1.4. Except the firm’s 
leverage condition, each control variable is statistically significant: MB and AIP are positively 
significant while BR, SIZE and DYLD are negatively significant. It can be obvious that MB and 
AIP has the positive association with Tobin’s Q since firm performance can be improved as there 
is much more growth opportunity and as investment on capital expenditure increases. Negative 
association between Q and the firm size is consistent with McConnell and Servaes (1990). 
                                           
11 Determinants are referred by McConaughy and Mishra (1997) and Frye (2004) 
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Table 1.5. Panel regression of Tobin’s Q for the confirmation of curvilinear relationship 
 
This table shows the result of panel regression result of Q on compensation variables and control variables. Combinations of compensations are applied to 
models. Data spans from 2006 to 2012 with annual basis. TDC2 is the total deferred compensation squared. Column (1) is the test result with only TDC and 
firm-level control variables. Column (2) to (7) shows the test result with each compensation and with possible combination of compensations along with 
control variables. Last column is the test result for the full model. Coefficients are shown and t-stat is in parenthesis. Inflection point is measured and 
presented to show the non-linear relationship between Q and the deferred compensation and the maximum point of Q.        *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
         
Intercept 
 
1.5943*** 1.5611*** 1.6074*** 1.5988*** 1.5742*** 1.6177*** 1.6414*** 1.9193*** 
  
(8.25) (7.56) (8.13) (8.27) (7.35) (7.45) (8.23) (6.62) 
Compensation 
        
TDC 
 
3.1056*** 3.0867*** 3.1207*** 2.9994*** 3.0999*** 2.9913*** 2.9932*** 2.8956*** 
  
(5.23) (5.19) (5.24) (4.97) (5.18) (4.94) (4.95) (4.76) 
TDC2 
 
-4.0187*** -3.9883*** -4.0317*** -3.8931*** -4.0011*** -3.8878*** -3.8704*** -3.7740*** 
  
(-3.05) (-3.02) (-3.06) (-2.94) (-3.03) (-2.93) (-2.92) (-2.85) 
Current 
  
0.0496 
  
0.0444 -0.0270 
 
-0.2883 
   
(0.46) 
  
(0.40) (-0.19) 
 
(-1.32) 
Incentive 
   
-0.0430 
 
-0.0316 
 
-0.1326 -0.3701 
    
(-0.32) 
 
(-0.23) 
 
(-0.87) (-1.57) 
Pension 
    
-0.0930 
 
-0.1091 -0.1394 -0.3945* 
     
(-0.94) 
 
(-0.84) (-1.24) (-1.76) 
Control Variables 
        
BR 
 
-0.0074*** -0.0075*** -0.0075*** -0.0074*** -0.0075*** -0.0074*** -0.0075*** -0.0075*** 
  
(-3.34) (-3.34) (-3.34) (-3.33) (-3.34) (-3.32) (-3.34) (-3.36) 
MB 
 
3.3949*** 3.3999*** 3.4127*** 3.3694*** 3.4124*** 3.3622*** 3.4114*** 3.4106*** 
  
(6.39) (6.39) (6.38) (6.33) (6.38) (6.30) (6.38) (6.38) 
AIP 
 
0.2010** 0.2005** 0.1996** 0.2038** 0.1996** 0.2045** 0.2010** 0.2037** 
  
(2.33) (2.32) (2.31) (2.36) (2.31) (2.36) (2.33) (2.36) 
LEV 
 
0.1077 0.1107 0.1062 0.1177 0.1092 0.1178 0.1179 0.1195 
  
(0.82) (0.84) (0.80) (0.89) (0.82) (0.89) (0.89) (0.90) 
SIZE 
 
-0.0393** -0.0371* -0.0388** -0.0369** -0.0370* -0.0377** -0.0343* -0.0377** 
  
(-2.11) (-1.93) (-2.07) (-1.97) (-1.93) (-1.96) (-1.80) (-1.97) 
DYLD 
 
-4.4124*** -4.3837*** -4.4893** -4.1323*** -4.4433*** -4.0994** -4.2294*** -4.0529** 
  
(-2.82) (-2.80) (-2.84) (-2.60) (-2.80) (-2.56) (-2.92) (-2.53) 
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Table 1.5 continued 
          
Inflection Point 
 
46.144% 46.144% 46.144% 46.144% 46.144% 46.144% 46.144% 46.144% 
          
R2   10.759% 10.781% 10.770% 10.851% 10.787% 10.855% 10.930% 11.112% 
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Table 1.6. Panel regression of Tobin’s Q for growth- and non-growth firms 
 
This table shows the result of panel regression result of Q on compensation variables and control variables for growth firms and non-growth 
firms. Firms are divided to be growth or non-growth firms by the median MB ratio in each industry. Data spans from 2006 to 2012 with 
annual basis. Column (1) to (4) shows the test result for growth firms and column (5) to (8) shows the test result for non-growth firms. 
Coefficients are shown and t-stat is in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
  
Growth Non-Growth 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
     
  
   
Intercept 
 
0.7673 0.7491 0.5452 0.8281* 2.0637*** 2.0675*** 2.1941*** 2.1561*** 
  
(1.61) (1.45) (1.09) (1.70) (10.39) (9.63) (10.72) (10.84) 
Compensation 
    
  
   
TDC 
 
2.5285*** 
   
1.0935*** 
   
  
(3.66) 
   
(3.86) 
   
Current 
  
-0.0109 
  
  0.1405 
  
   
(-0.04) 
  
  (1.25) 
  
Incentive 
   
0.6570* 
 
  
 
-0.0762 
 
    
(1.88) 
 
  
 
(-0.55) 
 
Pension 
    
-0.5642**   
  
-0.1594 
     
(-2.24)   
  
(-1.59) 
Control Variables 
    
  
   
BR 
 
-0.0030 -0.0063 -0.0046 -0.0061 -0.0070*** -0.0065*** -0.0065*** -0.0065*** 
  
(-0.37) (-0.75) (-0.56) (-0.74) (-3.23) (-2.97) (-2.99) (-2.98) 
MB 
 
3.7095*** 3.8993*** 3.5301*** 3.7508*** 3.0885*** 3.0158*** 3.0355*** 2.9533*** 
  
(3.02) (3.07) (2.77) (2.99) (5.11) (4.94) (4.95) (4.84) 
AIP 
 
0.5638** 0.6632** 0.6916*** 0.6633** 0.0734 0.0360 0.0324 0.0451 
  
(2.18) (2.50) (2.62) (2.53) (0.85) (0.41) (0.37) (0.52) 
LEV 
 
0.7291** 0.7691** 0.8344** 0.8775** -0.1021 -0.1165 -0.1251 -0.1073 
  
(2.05) (2.09) (2.28) (2.40) (-0.75) (-0.84) (-0.90) (-0.77) 
SIZE 
 
0.0054 0.0208 0.0121 0.0230 -0.0619*** -0.0509** -0.0564*** -0.0530*** 
  
(0.12) (0.43) (0.25) (0.49) (-3.20) (-2.52) (-2.88) (-2.70) 
DYLD 
 
-7.7742* -7.1715 -7.0499 -5.1268 -3.9413** -4.4065*** -4.6041*** -3.9555** 
  
(-1.79) (-1.59) (-1.59) (-1.13) (-2.50) (-2.77) (-2.84) (-2.45) 
      
  
   
R2   13.080% 7.567% 9.086% 9.714% 10.120% 8.234% 8.053% 8.373% 
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Conclusively, the inclusion of control variables does not change the main finding of the inverse 
U shape relationship between firm performance and deferred compensation. 
Table 1.6 reports the regression result to determine whether growth firms have more impact 
from deferred compensation for the firm performance or the investment choice problem. Growth 
firms typically reinvest their retained earnings in capital projects as they concern more on the 
firm performance and tend to have a higher degree of information asymmetry than non- or less-
growth firms. Therefore, incentive compensation could make CEOs in growth firm to incentivize 
and to work for the firm by reducing agency problem. As one type of incentive compensation by 
its characteristics and the timing issue, deferred compensation should work to improve the firm 
performance and to decrease the investment choice problem. Columns (1) to (4) are for growth 
firms and columns (5) to (8) are for non- or less-growth firms. As expected, deferred 
compensation has a positive and significant association with the firm performance in growth 
firms. Additionally, incentive compensation also seems statistically significant. Since a CEO in a 
growth firm concerns more on the firm performance, incentive compensation can align CEO’s 
motive to work in favor of the firm. Meanwhile, CEO’s pension plan is typically a defined 
benefit plan in which CEOs are guaranteed a specified and fixed payments regardless of the firm 
performance. So, CEO’s pension plan may shift the risk of the investment performance to the 
firm. Therefore, pension has a negative and significant relationship with the firm performance. 
On the contrary, CEO’s incentive compensation and pension plan seem to fail to improve the 
firm performance while deferred compensation still has the positive and significant association 
with the firm performance in non- or less-growth firms. In regard of control variables, AIP and 
LEV are the only two variables effective to the firm performance in growth firms but ineffective 
in non-growth firms. As growth firms emphasize on growing the firm, investment on capital 
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expenditure and firm’s debt condition are critical factors. Since deferred compensation is 
positive and significant to the firm performance in growth firms, the last hypothesis that deferred 
compensation could improve the investment choice problem for growth firms is confirmed. 
However, it is still not overt if deferred compensation could improve the investment choice 
problem in growth firms more than in non-growth firms since deferred compensation has a 
positive and significant association with the firm performance.  
To determine whether deferred compensation could work better for growth firms than for non-
growth firms, deferred compensation and deferred compensation squared, including control 
variables to avoid spurious correlation issue, are regressed against Tobin’s Q. Table 1.7 shows 
the result for non-growth firms. None of compensation items are significant except that deferred 
compensation is positively significant and deferred compensation squared is negatively 
significant, implying that deferred compensation is the sole compensation item that can align 
CEO’s incentive with firm’s goal so that CEO works for improving the firm performance. 
However, as claimed before, deferred compensation could work adversely for improving the firm 
performance and for fixing investment choice problem if deferred compensation is bestowed 
excessively. Inflection point remains the same as 46.144%.  
The result on growth firm in table 1.8 tells a different story. Deferred compensation is still 
positively significant and deferred compensation squared is negatively significant. However, 
inflection points in tests for growth firms shift significantly to 63.37%. It implies that 63.37% of 
deferred compensation contributes to improve the firm performance therefore to fix investment 
choice problem for growth firms while 46.14% of deferred compensation contributes to do so for 
non-growth firms. CEOs in growth firms will keep their positive attitude on the investment even 
after their compensation becomes debt-biased so the better firm performance can be expected to 
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stay longer as CEOs incentive is aligned with the firm’s goal by deferred compensation. 
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Table 1.7. Panel regression for the existence of curvilinear relationship for non-growth firms 
 
This table shows the result of panel regression result of Q on compensation variables and control variables for non-growth firms. Firms are divided to 
be growth or non-growth firms by the median MB ratio in each industry. Data spans from 2006 to 2012 with annual basis. TDC2 is the total deferred 
compensation squared. Column (1) to (4) shows the test result with each compensation along with control variables for non-growth firms and column 
(5) to (7) shows the test result with combination of compensations for non-growth firms. Column (8) is the test result for the full model. Coefficients 
are shown and t-stat is in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
  
Non-Growth 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
         
Intercept 
 
1.9739*** 1.9032*** 2.0176*** 1.9746*** 1.9535*** 1.9019*** 2.0481*** 2.1644*** 
  
(9.80) (8.83) (9.79) (9.80) (8.73) (8.43) (9.87) (7.37) 
Compensation 
        
TDC 
 
2.3389*** 2.3060*** 2.3752*** 2.2777*** 2.3431*** 2.3081*** 2.2527*** 2.2065*** 
  
(3.99) (3.93) (4.05) (3.82) (3.98) (3.86) (3.78) (3.67) 
TDC2 
 
-3.0364** -3.0009** -3.0487** -2.9771** -3.0179** -3.0028** -2.9148** -2.8582** 
  
(-2.42) (-2.39) (-2.43) (-2.37) (-2.41) (-2.39) (-2.32) (-2.27) 
Current 
  
0.1025 
  
0.0838 0.1042 
 
-0.1219 
   
(0.92) 
  
(0.74) (0.72) 
 
(-0.56) 
Incentive 
   
-0.1393 
 
-0.1192 
 
-0.2305 -0.3289 
    
(-1.01) 
 
(-0.85) 
 
(-1.46) (-1.39) 
Pension 
    
-0.0585 
 
0.0025 -0.1402 -0.2464 
     
(-0.57) 
 
(0.02) (-1.21) (-1.11) 
Control Variables 
        
BR 
 
-0.0071*** -0.0071*** -0.0071*** -0.0071*** -0.0071*** -0.0071*** -0.0071*** -0.0071*** 
  
(-3.29) (-3.27) (-3.31) (-3.28) (-3.29) (-3.27) (-3.29) (-3.30) 
MB 
 
3.0843*** 3.0906*** 3.1417*** 3.0624*** 3.1385*** 3.0916*** 3.1270*** 3.1204*** 
  
(5.13) (5.13) (5.20) (5.08) (5.19) (5.11) (5.17) (5.16) 
AIP 
 
0.0947 0.0943 0.0905 0.0966 0.0908 0.0942 0.0923 0.0933 
  
(1.09) (1.09) (1.04) (1.11) (1.05) (1.08) (1.06) (1.07) 
LEV 
 
-0.0990 -0.0947 -0.1024 -0.0941 -0.0984 -0.0948 -0.0927 -0.0912 
  
(-0.73) (-0.69) (-0.75) (-0.69) (-0.72) (-0.69) (-0.68) (-0.67) 
SIZE 
 
-0.0600*** -0.0552*** -0.0584*** -0.0583*** -0.0548*** -0.0552*** -0.0533*** -0.0548*** 
  
(-3.11) (-2.77) (-3.02) (-2.99) (-2.74) (-2.77) (-2.70) (-2.74) 
DYLD 
 
-4.0323** -4.0179** -4.3256*** -3.8706** -4.2745*** -4.0245** -4.1304** -4.0612** 
  
(-2.56) (-2.55) (-2.71) (-2.42) (-2.67) (-2.49) (-2.57) (-2.52) 
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Table 1.7 continued 
          
Inflection Point 46.144% 46.144% 46.144% 46.144% 46.144% 46.144% 46.144% 46.144% 
          
R2   10.946% 11.064% 11.089% 10.992% 11.165% 11.064% 11.293% 11.337% 
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Table 1.8. Panel regression for the existence of curvilinear relationship for growth firms 
 
This table shows the result of panel regression result of Q on compensation variables and control variables for growth firms. Firms are divided to be 
growth or non-growth firms by the median MB ratio in each industry. Data spans from 2006 to 2012 with annual basis. TDC2 is the total deferred 
compensation squared. Column (1) to (4) shows the test result with each compensation along with control variables for growth firms and column (5) to 
(7) shows the test result with combination of compensations for growth firms. Column (8) is the test result for the full model. Coefficients are shown 
and t-stat is in parenthesis. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
  
Growth 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Variables 
         
Intercept 
 
0.5752 0.6511 0.4532 0.6450 0.4866 1.0661** 0.5290 1.6236** 
  
(1.20) (1.29) (0.93) (1.33) (0.94) (1.98) (1.05) (2.06) 
Compensation 
        
TDC 
 
6.5251*** 6.7200*** 6.1171*** 5.8458*** 6.2064*** 5.8413*** 5.7917*** 5.9417*** 
  
(3.23) (3.27) (3.00) (2.79) (2.96) (2.80) (2.76) (2.85) 
TDC2 
 
-10.7550** -11.2548** -9.9061** -9.3626* -10.1276* -9.7939* -9.2425* -10.3671** 
  
(-2.10) (-2.16) (-1.93) (-1.79) (-1.92) (-1.88) (-1.76) (-1.97) 
Current 
  
-0.1417 
  
-0.0534 -0.6212* 
 
-1.1139* 
   
(-0.53) 
  
(-0.19) (-1.75) 
 
(-1.80) 
Incentive 
   
0.4534 
 
0.4358 
 
0.3364 -0.6476 
    
(1.32) 
 
(1.22) 
 
(0.88) (-0.97) 
Pension 
    
-0.3067 
 
-0.6945** -0.1944 -1.2182* 
     
(-1.20) 
 
(-2.06) (-0.68) (-1.91) 
Control Variables 
        
BR 
 
-0.0019 -0.0014 -0.0009 -0.0021 -0.0008 -0.0004 -0.0013 -0.0006 
  
(-0.23) (-0.17) (-0.11) (-0.26) (-0.10) (-0.05) (-0.16) (-0.07) 
MB 
 
3.6954*** 3.6679*** 3.4474*** 3.6277*** 3.4466*** 3.4212*** 3.4685*** 3.5640*** 
  
(3.03) (3.00) (2.80) (2.97) (2.79) (2.80) (2.81) (2.90) 
AIP 
 
0.6303** 0.6368** 0.6485** 0.6283** 0.6502** 0.6540** 0.6425** 0.6470** 
  
(2.44) (2.46) (2.51) (2.43) (2.51) (2.54) (2.48) (2.51) 
LEV 
 
0.7946** 0.7847** 0.8353** 0.8471** 0.8300** 0.8701** 0.8581** 0.8671** 
  
(2.24) (2.20) (2.35) (2.37) (2.32) (2.45) (2.40) (2.44) 
SIZE 
 
-0.0008 -0.0053 -0.0060 0.0020 -0.0075 -0.0141 -0.0029 -0.0175 
  
(-0.02) (-0.11) (-0.13) (0.04) (-0.16) (-0.30) (-0.06) (-0.37) 
DYLD 
 
-8.6533** -9.0130** -8.4939* -7.4010* -8.6358* -7.3949* -7.7412* -6.7353 
  
(-2.00) (-2.05) (-1.96) (-1.66) (-1.96) (-1.67) (-1.73) (-1.50) 
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Table 1.8 continued 
          
Inflection Point 63.367% 63.367% 65.457% 65.457% 63.367% 61.277% 59.188% 59.188% 
          
R2   14.875% 14.988% 15.581% 15.458% 15.596% 16.686% 15.768% 17.063% 
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Further Investigation 
Inflection Point 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) compares CEO’s debt position and the firm’s debt structure in 
terms of ratio and many empirical literature employs CEO’s inside debt/equity ratio and firm’s 
leverage ratio to explain the effect of deferred compensation on the investment choice problem. 
However, this study focuses on the inflection point to understand the investment choice problem. 
However, it would be necessary to compare deferred compensation with firm’s debt condition 
for the better understanding, using the inflection point. The inflection point of deferred 
compensation on Tobin’s Q for all firms is 46.14% and the average firm’s debt-asset ratio is 58.3% 
for all firms. So, CEOs seem to improve the investment choice problem as deferred 
compensation increase but seem to trigger the investment choice problem adversely by changing 
their attitude toward conservatism soon although the firm still may want to invest more. For 
growth firms, the inflection point is near 63.37% but the firm’s debt situation seems similar as 
58.04% on average. CEOs in growth firms are found to be still aggressive or positive even after 
their own debt condition surpasses the firm’s entire debt condition. It may be because CEOs in 
growth firms main focus on the improvement of the firm performance as long as they are 
incentivized and aligned with the firm by the proper incentive compensation which is proven 
deferred compensation regardless of the firm’s debt situation.  
Different Behavior in Current and Incentive Compensations 
Table 1.9 shows the regression results for the model with both of current and incentive 
compensations for before-2006 and after-2006 periods. R2 of before-2006 period is 5.909% with 
current and incentive compensations and two compensations are statistically negatively 
significant. Meanwhile, R2 of after-2006 period is 6.497% with the same compensations both of 
 51 
 
which are positively significant. As all compensation items have been disclosed since 2006, all 
compensation items are applied into regression for after-2006 period. R2 increases to 10.266%. 
In this model, current compensation is found insignificant but incentive compensation and 
pension are negatively significant. Deferred compensation is found positively significant.  
Why do current and incentive compensation show the opposite behavior in table 1.9, still 
holding their significant effect? In 1992, the SEC requires firms to report the compensation 
package in a standardized format. However, firms are not required to disclose all compensations. 
To avoid the possible outrage cost, firms shift large amount of compensation to the other 
compensations which firms are not required to report in the standardized format. Hence, amounts 
in current and incentive compensations may not be accurate. Because of the shift of the 
compensation due to the outrage cost regardless of the investment choice or firm’s performance, 
coefficients for those two compensations are negative although they are statistically significant. 
However, after 2006 when firms are required to disclose all compensation, firms may not be able 
to shift any amount from one to the other compensation. Therefore, the accurate amounts are 
reported and used in the test. They are found positively significant for the firm’s performance or 
investment choice.  
Substitution effect can be considered to be one of the reasons that two compensations have 
positive association with the firm performance. After 2006, CEOs cannot shift large amount to 
the other compensations but especially powerful CEOs can substitute deferred compensation for 
the other types of compensation as claimed by Fulmer (2014). When a firm generates poor 
performance, CEO will face the pay cut if CEO is responsible for the poor performance. 
However, the pay cut is made up with by the increase in firm contribution of deferred 
compensation. As there is the positive relationship between the firm performance and the CEO 
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payment such as current and incentive compensation, the test result for after-2006 period has 
positive and significant coefficients for current and incentive compensation.  
CEO Age and Deferred Compensation 
Table 1.10 reports the Pearson correlation between CEO age and compensations. Obviously, 
there is a positive and significant correlation between CEO age and deferred compensation. As 
CEOs become old, they prefer guaranteed rate of return. Earning from deferred compensation is 
fixed or guaranteed return and is higher than market return. Due to the regulation by the 
Congress, caps on salaries have adverse effect on retirement income especially for highly 
compensated CEOs because lowered caps by the tightened regulation could lower the tax-
qualified plan benefit. Hence, CEOs would prefer, as they become old or have to retire, non-tax-
qualified plan such as deferred compensation in which CEOs can shift the tax burden onto the 
firm. Therefore, there is the positive relationship between the CEO age and the deferred 
compensation. 
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Table 1.9. Panel regression for before- and after-200 periods with current and incentive compensation 
This table shows the result of panel regression result of Tobin's Q on firm-level control variables and two 
compensations of Current and Incentive for two periods of before-2006 and after-2006. Before-2006 means 
the data from 1992 to 2005 and after-2006 is from 2006 to 2012.  
            
  
Before 2006 After 2006 
Variables 
     
Intercept 
 
6.3303 *** 2.5869 *** 
  
(19.85) (18.51) 
BR 
 
-0.0016 * -0.0017 *** 
  
(-1.9) (-2.88) 
MB 
 
0.0127 *** 0.0111 ** 
  
(3.26) (2.31) 
AIP 
 
-1.1143 *** -0.5117 *** 
  
(-13.83) (-10.23) 
LEV 
 
0.0146 
 
0.5435 *** 
  
(0.73) (8.25) 
SIZE 
 
-0.2684 *** -0.1310 *** 
  
(-15.97) (-10.33) 
DYLD 
 
0.1194 
 
-0.1325 
 
  
(1.13) (-0.36) 
      
Compensation 
    
Current 
 
-1.8731 *** 0.2576 *** 
  
(-6.51) (2.91) 
Incentive 
 
-0.6563 *** 0.5870 *** 
  
(-2.25) (6.11) 
      
R2   5.909% 6.497% 
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Table 1.10. Pearson Correlation Coefficients among CEO age and deferred compensations 
This table shows the result of Pearson Correlation Coefficients among CEO age and compensation 
components. Firm contribution is the ratio of the firm contribution to total compensation, executive 
contribution is the ratio of the executive contribution to total compensation, and deferred earnings is the 
ratio of the earnings on deferred compensation to total compensation. TDC is the ratio of the sum of firm 
contribution, executive contribution and earnings on deferred compensation to total compensation. Total 
compensation is the sum of current, incentive, pension, and deferred compensation. 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients 
( P-value in parenthesis, Prob > |r| ) 
      
 
CEO Age 
Firm  
Contribution 
Executive  
Contribution 
Deferred  
Earnings 
Total Deferred  
Compensation 
      
CEO Age 1 0.02863 0.07237 0.03364 0.07048 
  
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
      
Firm Contribution 0.02863 1 0.02499 0.02552 0.53964 
 
(<.0001) 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
      
Executive Contribution 0.07237 0.02499 1 0.12174 0.56425 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) 
      
Deferred Earnings 0.03364 0.02552 0.12174 1 0.71221 
 
(<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
 
(<.0001) 
      
Total Deferred  0.07048 0.53964 0.56425 0.71221 1 
Compensation (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) (<.0001) 
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Conclusion 
For a couple of decades, a number of literature researches have examined the principal-agency 
problem. Among them, many have attempted to solve this agency problem by controlling 
motivations of CEOs, especially in large and publicly held firms, to make decisions 
synchronized with the shareholders’ wealth maximization. Hence, many researchers have aimed 
to examine the relation between the executive compensation and the firm’s performance because 
the executive compensation is believed the sure way to control CEO’s motivation. As equity-
based incentive compensation is claimed incapable to have CEOs work for the firm’s goal and 
deferred compensation has become available since 2006, deferred compensation draws its 
attention and many researches have been conducted to determine if deferred compensation, along 
with pension, could align CEOs’ motives with the firm’s motive so as to decrease agency 
problem and to improve firm performance. This study aims to investigate the curvilinear 
relationship between Tobin’s Q and deferred compensation to manifest the impact of deferred 
compensation on the investment choice problem and finds that there is the inverse U shape 
relationship between two variables, indicating that increase in deferred compensation to CEO 
can lead the improvement in the investment choice problem but later it can adversely cause the 
increase in the investment choice problem when excessively large amount of deferred 
compensation is accumulated after the inflection point. This main finding is claimed to be the 
contribution to the finance literature. Inclusion of control variables such as determinants for 
Tobin’s Q and of the other types of compensation does not change the CEO’s attitude toward the 
investment choice problem because it fails to induce the change in the inflection point. Growth 
firm is known for the high degree of information asymmetry hence growth firm and shareholders 
look for and emphasize incentive compensation to reduce the agency problem and the investment 
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choice problem. Due to its characteristics and the timing issue, deferred compensation is 
expected to incentivize CEOs to work for the firm. In this regards, this study investigates if 
deferred compensation could align CEOs in growth firms with the firm’s goal so that it could 
improve the investment choice problem. Test result finds that the inflection point of the 
curvilinear relationship between Tobin’s Q and deferred compensation for growth firm shifts 
rightward and concludes that CEOs in growth firms tend to work for the firm even after CEO’s 
compensation becomes debt-biased and CEO’s debt/equity ratio for compensation is greater than 
the firm’s debt condition. It implies that deferred compensation performs better in motivating 
CEOs for growth firms than for non-growth firms. Interestingly, when current and incentive 
compensation are tested, current and incentive compensation are negatively significant before 
2006 regulation but positively significant after 2006 regulation. It can be interpreted by the shift 
of a large portion of compensation to the other compensations which firms are not required to 
disclose in order to avoid the possible outrage costs and by the substitution effect in 
compensation that CEO’s pay cut due to the poor performance could be filled up with the 
increase in deferred compensation. As CEOs become old or are about to retire, CEOs prefer 
deferred compensation as deferred compensation rewards a guaranteed rate of return and can 
give non-tax qualified plan benefit. This study is one of a few researches that investigate the 
positive and negative effect of deferred compensation at the same time using the curvilinear 
relationship but still have room to investigate by introducing new methodologies such as a two 
stage model and applying the other variables as a proxy for the investment choice problem.  
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Essay 2: Corporate Cash Holdings and Exposure to Macroeconomic Uncertainty 
Introduction 
During recent decades, both U.S. and European firms have accumulated unusually high 
levels of cash. Bates et al. (2009) showed that the average cash ratio, cash and marketable 
securities over total assets, of U.S. firms has been drastically increased during the period of 
1980 – 2006 from 10.5% in 1980 to 23.2% in 2006. This increasing trend in cash holdings 
has become steeper in recent years. Cash holdings in aggregate level has increased with an 
annual rate of 10% from $1.22 trillion in 1995 to $4.97 trillion in 2010 while it grew with 
growth rate of 7% from $453 billion to $1.22 trillion during 1980 – 1995.12 It is costly for 
firms to hold cash or to keep a high level of cash holdings. By holding cash and marketable 
securities, firms should forego promising investment opportunities hence should deal with 
opportunity costs. There could also be opportunity costs because the cash holdings could 
have been used for increasing in firm value or shareholders’ wealth by paying dividends or 
acquiring capital stocks or other firms. Also the high level of cash and equivalents can cause 
the agency problems to firms. Therefore, it is pricey for firms to hold cash. Then, why have 
firms been keeping the high level of cash holdings? According to Keynes (1936), there are 
two major benefits, one of which is the decrease in transaction costs. The other benefit is the 
precautionary benefit, meaning that firms reserve cash to hedge the cash shortfalls in the 
future. Besides, the question why firms hold cash can be important and challenging because 
financial decision related to cash holdings cannot be determined in isolation of the real 
decisions that firms should make under any given business circumstances. To answer the 
                                           
12 Juan M. Sanchez and Emircan Yurdagul, Why Are Corporations Holding So Much Cash?, 2013, Federal 
Reserve Bank in St. Louis. https://www.stlouisfed.org/publications/re/articles/?id=2314#fig1 
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question on the increase in cash holdings, literature has focused on the real financial 
decisions such as leverage, cash flows, growth opportunities, and firm size.  
The literature on corporate cash holdings identifies four motives to hold cash. First two 
motives popularly known as transaction and precautionary motives were originally proposed 
by Keynes (1936). Firms can raise the capital from the external capital markets, renegotiating 
outstanding capital contracts, liquidating other assets, and the internal cash balance. External 
sources of capital are expensive, especially more when economy is downturn while internal 
source is less costly, even though there is the opportunity cost for using internal source of 
capital. So, transaction motive means that firms would prefer holding cash as the internal 
source of capital to raising capital from external sources, especially when the external sources 
become expensive due to the poor economic condition. It also states that the large firms tend 
to hold less cash because they face lower transaction costs due to economies of scale in 
converting a non-cash financial asset into cash. Later, Baumol (1952), Miller and Orr (1966) 
and Bates et al. (2009) improve and test the transaction motive empirically. Secondly, the 
precautionary motive states that companies with more investment and growth opportunities 
hold more cash to hedge against very costly adverse shocks in cash flows (Opler et al. (1999), 
Almeida et al. (2004), and Han and Qiu (2007)). Lins et al. (2010) distinguish corporate 
liquidity into two parts of cash and lines of credit and find that lines of credit are related to 
corporate’s need for external financing to fund investment opportunities while cash is related 
to buffer against future cash shortage. Risk-averse management would behave more 
cautiously and prefer more cash holdings when it is less confident on future macroeconomic 
conditions and when it expects the greater volatility in future cash flows and the greater 
difficulty in accessing capital markets. Consistent with the precautionary motive, finance 
method motive can help to explain firms’ cash holdings behavior because especially when 
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economy is in recession, it is hard and expensive for firms to externally finance so that firms 
hold more cash for future investment. Firms save cash to initiate or continue investing in 
positive NPV projects when external financing method is difficult and costly due to the 
economic downturn. The third motive for holding cash is the tax motive proposed by Foley et 
al. (2007) and it states that multinational firms can take advantage of the tax treatment of 
remittances to keep earnings abroad when the cash repatriation costs high. However, 
Pinkowitz et al. (2012) test multinational firms to see if the tax cost of repatriation could be 
(more) important for (high) cash flow and find out the tax cost is not related with the cash 
holdings in multinational firms. Even, the Homeland Investment Act of 2004 designed to 
decrease in tax cost of repatriation cannot reduce the cash holdings for multinational firms. 
Hence, whether or not tax motive can work for change in firms’ cash holdings is still 
underway. Finally, the agency motive deals with the conflicts that arise between managers 
and outside investors on how to deploy internally generated funds. There is the conflict 
between managers and shareholders concerning the distribution of the internal capital. Firm’s 
cash holdings can be distributed to shareholders, sustained internally, or spent for capital 
stock repurchase. Jensen (1986) claim the free cash flow theory, claiming that entrenched 
managers are more likely to hold more cash rather than to increase the payout to shareholders 
or to spend for the other purposes. Dittmar et al. (2003) find that firms in countries where 
investor protection is low tend to hold more cash whereas firms in countries where investors 
have power to control management have low level of cash holdings. Harford et al. (2008) 
conclude that firms with more entrenched managers hold lower level of cash holdings than 
similar firms with less or not-entrenched managers. Nikolov and Whited (2011) investigate 
the effect of agency problem to the firm value through the level of cash holdings and find that 
agency problem can cause the cash holdings to rise by 22% and consequently the 
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shareholders’ value to fall by 6%. Gao et al. (2013) assert that agency problem influences the 
target level of cash holdings and how managers react to excess cash holdings and conclude 
that the greater the agency problem, especially in public firms, the higher the tendency that 
managers have cash holdings.  
Much of the literature has investigated how the cash holdings of firms have evolved and 
whether this evolution can be explained by changes in known determinants of cash holdings. 
Among determinants, recent research has focused on the role of firm-specific characteristics. 
Opler et al. (1999) show that, for US public companies, the cash-to-asset ratio is negatively 
related to size and book-to-market and positively related to capital expenditure, payouts, 
R&D expenditure, and cash flow volatility. Consistent with Opler et al. (1999), Han and Qiu 
(2007) show that the volatility of cash flows has a positive impact on a firm’s precautionary 
motive for holding cash. However, this positive relation is significant only for financially 
constrained forms. Further support for the precautionary motive is provided by Duchin 
(2010) showing that increase in cash flow uncertainty can help explain the build-up in cash 
holdings by public firms, and by McLean (2011) showing that share issuance has become an 
increasingly important source of cash for firms with high precautionary motives as captured 
by large R&D expenditures and high cash flow volatility. Pinkowitz et al. (2012) and Gao et 
al. (2013) apply a set of firm specific variables such as sales growth, leverage, public debt, 
and net working capital to explain the cash holdings in multinational firms and to find the 
difference in the impact of firm specific variables on cash holdings between U.S. public firms 
and private firms. 
In addition to firm-specific variables, macroeconomic conditions can play an important 
role on firms’ cash holdings behavior. Changes in economic environment in a country are 
closely associated with changes in macroeconomic factors such as interest rate, inflation, and 
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consumption level. Changes in these macroeconomic variables sequentially affect the 
quantity and price of the product, firm’s cash flows, firm’s financial decision and eventually 
firm value. Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) explain the high preference in cash and equivalence 
with “credit crunch” story in which capital becomes scarce during the economic downturn. 
Korajczyk and Levy (2003) frame firms’ target capital structure model as a function of firm-
specific and macroeconomic variables and find that macroeconomic variables are significant 
for security issue choice for financially unconstrained firms but less significant for 
constrained firms. Consistently, Erel et al. (2012) find that an economic downturn leads the 
decrease in the expected maturity of public bonds and private loans, indicating that firms 
during an economic downturn tend to hold more cash and equivalence. 
Firms’ exposure to these macroeconomic uncertainties can also affect firm’s decision 
making including cash holdings. This paper introduces and examines the trade-off model for 
optimal cash holdings under the macroeconomic uncertainties. The trade-off model expresses 
that the optimal cash holdings are determined by the trade-off between the marginal costs and 
benefits of the cash holdings. The marginal costs of cash holdings are the opportunity cost of 
the capital invested in liquid assets and the agency cost stemming from the managerial 
behavior relevant to cash holdings. The marginal benefits are related with the decrease in 
transactions to raise capital hence with the improvement in information asymmetry and the 
decrease in agency cost with the external financing. A firm would optimize the level of cash 
holdings in the way that the marginal benefits equal to marginal costs of cash holdings to 
maximize the firm’s value. Both costs and benefits of cash holdings, by description, can be 
affected by macroeconomic variables as well as firm-specific variables. Therefore, according 
to the trade-off model, a firm with higher exposure to macroeconomic uncertainties would be 
expected to have more cash holdings than a firm with lower exposure to macroeconomic 
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uncertainties. When macroeconomic uncertainties arise, economic policies respond, resulting 
in changes in interest rates, inflation rates, exchange rates, and price level. The interaction of 
these variables will eventually influence firm’s level of demand, price of firm’s products and 
cash flows as well as firm’s ultimate value. Hence, corporate capital structure and strategy 
should determine how to react the macroeconomic uncertainties which affect cash holdings 
and firm value. The factors that determine how macroeconomic uncertainties affect firm 
value, cash flow, and cash holdings are the macroeconomic structure and the firms’ exposure 
to changes in macroeconomic conditions. Hence, changes in macroeconomic variables cause 
the macroeconomic uncertainties to rise, which ultimately affect the firm’s value and cash 
flows. In this respect, much literature has attempted to find the influence of the 
macroeconomic uncertainties on the firm’s cash holdings. Baum et al. (2006) consider the 
impact of macroeconomic volatility on the cross sectional dispersion of corporate cash 
holdings and find negative relation between economic uncertainty and the dispersion of firms’ 
cash-to-asset ratio, meaning that at stabilized economy firms tend to show more 
idiosyncratical attitude and freedom on the level of cash holdings. This evidence is explained 
by the manager’s ability to make more accurate cash flow forecasts when the economy is 
stable and less accurate when it is not. Hence, when macroeconomic conditions are volatile, 
managers will pose a more conservative behavior by increasing the liquidity level of the firm 
because they cannot predict the future cash flow. Hackbarth et al. (2006) argue that operating 
cash flows of the leverage firm depend on the firm-specific shocks and the aggregate shocks 
which reflect the state of the economy. Aggregate shocks are measured by default policy 
because default policy reflects the possibility to default which can be triggered either by the 
idiosyncratic shock or the change in aggregate shocks. Irvine and Pontiff (2007) show that 
the idiosyncratic risk is positively related with the cash flow volatility. The increase in 
 66 
 
idiosyncratic risk may lead to the increase in non-hedgeable risk and after all to the increase 
in precautionary demand for cash. Consistent with Irvine and Pontiff (2007), Gao and 
Grinstein (2014) assert that firm-level heterogeneous risks due to economic factors should be 
disaggregated into systematic risk and idiosyncratic risk and argue that uncertainties in 
macroeconomic factors such as the prime rate and market risk premium should be taken into 
account to examine the change in cash holdings. They apply macroeconomic uncertainties as 
the additional factor to explain the cash holdings because macroeconomic uncertainties are 
less likely affected by firm-specific factors. Foley et al. (2007) and Acharya et al. (2013) find 
aggregate level uncertainties such as changes in tax policy and frictions in financial system 
causes the change in cash holdings of firms.  
Consistent with Baum et al. (2006) and Gao and Grinstein (2014), the premise of this 
paper is that one of the major components of cash holdings is the exposure to macroeconomic 
uncertainties. Hence, this paper examines how macroeconomic uncertainties along with firm-
specific variables significantly influence the cash holdings of a firm. However, unlike 
previous research, this paper advances the analyses of cash holdings in the following manner. 
First, based on the premise that both time-series and cross-sectional variations in 
macroeconomic uncertainties would induce heterogeneity in cash holdings of firms, this 
paper incorporates the impact of time-varying macroeconomic factors on cash holdings. 
Baum et al. (2006) claim that macroeconomic uncertainty may explain the change in cash 
holdings represented by the dispersion of cash-asset ratio with the homogeneity assumption 
on the reaction to the macroeconomic uncertainty. Gao and Grinstein (2014) claim that firms 
may have different levels of exposure to market-level risks hence introduce uncertainty in 
GDP, uncertainty in prime rate, and uncertainty in economic policies. However, while Gao 
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and Grinstein (2014) partially applies heterogeneity13, this paper introduces heterogeneity 
more thoroughly for macroeconomic uncertainties since firms will have different level of 
changes in product price, in product demand, in cash flows, and consequently in cash 
holdings when there is a certain level of macroeconomic uncertainty in the economy. 
Utilizing panel data and univariate GARCH model, this paper estimates the time-varying 
exposure to macroeconomic uncertainties. This time-varying exposure is able to explain the 
behavior of cash holdings. With this estimated exposure firms react differently since they 
receive different level of impact from macroeconomic uncertainties based on firms’ 
characteristics. Therefore, it is assumed that firms’ reaction to exposure is heterogeneous but 
that the reaction is constant over time for one firm. Following Baum et al. (2004) and Gao 
and Grinstein (2014), this paper applies firm’s exposure to macroeconomic uncertainties as 
another variables to take into account in addition to the firm-specific variables in the model. 
Firm-specific factors can determine the way firms react to macroeconomic factors. However, 
as firm-specific factors such as CEO characteristics affect the cash holdings behavior but are 
not influenced by macroeconomic factors, there can be macroeconomic factors such as 
population and unemployment rate which can affect cash holdings and which can explain the 
behavior of cash holdings that firm-specific factors cannot explain. Therefore, to accurately 
measure the performance of the exposure of macroeconomic uncertainties to cash holding 
behavior, it is more relevant to take macroeconomic uncertainties into the consideration as an 
additional variable. However, unlike Gao and Grinstein (2014), this paper does not employ 
stock market uncertainty as an additional variable into the model since stock market volatility 
fails to contribute macroeconomic uncertainty and since there is a lack of sufficient 
                                           
13 Gao and Grinstein (2014) decompose firm-level uncertainty into systematic and idiosyncratic parts and apply 
them as additional variables. However, they do not show how differently the decomposed parts can affect the 
level of cash holdings for each individual firm.  
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supportive evidence on the relationship between the stock market volatility and the 
macroeconomic volatility. Nasseh and Strauss (2000) and Diebold and Yilmaz (2008) claim 
that macroeconomic volatility may not be accounted for by the stock market volatility and 
Jurado et al (2015) and Zakaria and Shamsuddin (2012) conclude that stock market volatility 
is not related with the macroeconomic volatility. Systematic and idiosyncratic volatilities, 
along with firm-specific variables, are measured using Gao and Grinstein (2014) 
methodology and are applied to the random and fixed effect models, respectively. R-square 
of each model is lower than those in the test results of this paper with the macroeconomic 
uncertainty variables measured in this paper. 
Heterogeneity in firms’ exposure to macroeconomic uncertainty, in this paper, is applied 
to distinguish firms by the firms’ exposure degree and macroeconomic uncertainties are 
estimated by macroeconomic conditions variables. It is the improvement from the previous 
research and the contribution to the literature. To repeat, this paper expands the level of 
understanding regarding the relationship between macroeconomic uncertainty and firms’ cash 
holdings behavior by applying the different level of uncertainty exposures for each different 
firm and by applying more precise uncertainty parameters at macroeconomic level.  
Following the introduction in section 1, section 2 will discuss hypothesis to test. In 
section 3, data and methodology will be described. Each empirical test in accordance with the 
methodology will be followed and also finds are interpreted. In the last section, this paper 
makes the conclusion.  
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Hypotheses 
This paper introduces the trade-off model to explain the firm’s capital structure under the 
macroeconomic uncertainties. The trade-off model claims that the firm’s cash holdings are 
determined by the trade-off between the marginal costs and benefits of the cash holdings. The 
marginal costs of cash holdings are the opportunity cost of the capital invested in liquid assets 
and the agency cost related to the managerial behavior on how to deal with cash holdings. 
The marginal benefits are related to the decrease in transaction costs to raise capital hence to 
the improvement in information asymmetry and the decrease in agency cost with the external 
financing. The cost of external funding increases with the level of information asymmetries. 
A firm could optimize the level of cash holdings by equalizing the marginal benefits with the 
marginal costs of cash holdings. The trade-off model explains firm’s cash holdings behavior 
with two motives: transaction motive and precautionary motive. Transaction motive means 
that firms would prefer holding cash as the internal source of capital to raising capital from 
external sources, especially when the external sources become expensive. The trade-off 
model under transaction motives can state that cash holdings could cause the opportunity cost 
of the capital invested in liquid assets to increase, the agency cost to possibly decrease and 
the transaction cost for raising capital to decrease. So, firms prefer cash holdings. 
Precautionary motive means that firms would prefer holding cash to investing in promising 
projects when the economic condition is poor. By holding cash, firms can save transaction 
costs that they should have spent for raising fund from external source and will be able to 
initiate projects when the economic condition becomes well. Again, firms prefer cash 
holdings. Both costs and benefits of cash holdings, by description, can be affected by 
macroeconomic variables as well as firm-specific variables. The change in interest rate in the 
market, for example, could cause the fluctuation in the opportunity cost of the capital 
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invested in liquid assets and also could impact on the transaction costs to raise capital from 
external sources. Therefore, according to the trade-off model, firms would tend to have more 
cash holdings when macroeconomic conditions are worse or when macroeconomic 
uncertainties increase due to the trade-off model. Also, as Subramaniam et al (2010) claim 
with diversified vs. focused firms, firms have their own capital structures and this difference 
in capital structure will have firms exposed by different degree to the macroeconomic 
uncertainties. Diversified firms, for example, would be able to naturally hedge against 
macroeconomic uncertainties so less affected less than focused firms. Consequently, they 
have less incentive to hold cash. Therefore, in general, firms with higher exposure to 
macroeconomic uncertainties would be expected to have more cash holdings than a firm with 
lower exposure to macroeconomic uncertainties. As macroeconomic uncertainties vary over 
time, a firm would also exhibit time varying cash holdings behavior, rather than common 
exposure measure is applied to every firms. However, a firm’s degree of exposure to 
macroeconomic uncertainties is expected to be constant. Hence, the first and the second 
hypothesis to test are as follows: 
Hypothesis 1: Firms tend to have more cash holdings as macroeconomic uncertainties 
increases 
Figure 2.1: Cash ratio (Total cash over Total Asset) over time 
 
* The shaded area represents official recession dates according to NBER 
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Figure 2.1 show the cash ratio over time from 1970 to 2013. Cash ratio tends to show 
upward slope over time. It seems that economic condition is associated with cash holdings 
level. When it is expected to be or is in the recession, firms tend to maintain high level of 
cash holdings. Graphically, figure 2.1 supports the hypothesis 1. 
Hypothesis 2: Firms with different degree of exposure to macroeconomic uncertainties 
tend to have different level of cash holdings: The more sensitive the firms to the 
macroeconomic uncertainties, the more cash holdings firms have. 
Figure 2.2: Cash Ratio over time for firms in different quartiles 
 
Figure 2.2 shows the cash ratio over time for firms in different quartiles. Firms are 
broken down into four quartiles according to the sensitivity of stock return to macroeconomic 
uncertainty. Cash ratio of firms in one quartile is different to that in the other quartiles, 
although overall cash ratio tends to increase over time. Graphical illustration of figure 2.1 and 
2.2 help to build the hypothesis as shown above and are supportive to the hypothesis. 
However, it is necessary to empirically test if cash holdings show the behavior as claimed in 
the hypothesis.  
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Data and Methodology  
Methodology 
This study employ univariate ARMA-GARCH model to measure time-varying 
macroeconomic uncertainties. The mean and variance specifications of macroeconomic 
condition are modeled as follows: 
𝑋𝑡 = 𝛽𝑍𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡,                           where 𝜀𝑡 ~ 𝑁(0, ℎ𝑡)  
  (1) 
ℎ𝑡 = 𝜔 + 𝛼(𝐿)ℎ𝑡−1 + 𝛽(𝐿)𝜀𝑡−1
2      (2) 
, where 𝑋𝑡 denotes macroeconomic conditions. 𝑍𝑡−1 = [1, 𝑋𝑡−1, 𝑋𝑡−2, ⋯ , 𝑋𝑡−𝑘] and 𝛽 
is a vector of parameters corresponding to 𝑍𝑡−1. The error term 𝜀𝑡, is assumed to follow 
normal distribution with the mean 0 and the variance ℎ𝑡. The conditional standard deviation 
√ℎ𝑡 is the measure for macroeconomic uncertainties. Main equations (1) and (2) are jointly 
estimated with the maximum likelihood method. For firms in U.S., Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti 
(ADS) business conditions index, GDP growth rate, and TED spread are employed to 
estimate √ℎ𝑡. 
Since data is not only time-series but also cross-sectional, it is more appropriate to 
estimate with the panel data model. Based on the extant literature (Opler et al (1999) and 
Bates et al (2009)), the main model specification is chosen for firm i at time t as follows: 
𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛾𝑖 + 𝜃𝑖√ℎ𝑡 + 𝜏(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠)   (3) 
, where Cash Ratio stands for the ratio of cash and marketable securities to total assets 
excluding cash and marketable securities, √ℎ𝑡  is the measure of macroeconomic 
uncertainties obtained from equation (1) and (2), and 𝜃𝑖 represents the exposure of the 
firm’s cash ratio to macroeconomic uncertainties, which is the major issue in this study. 
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Guided by the previous literature, this paper applies Market-to-book ratio (MB), firm 
size(Size), cash flow to asset (CashF), net working capital to asset (NWC), investment (Inv), 
leverage (Lev), dividend payout dummy (Div), and acquisition (Acq) as control variables as 
well as the lagged value of cash holdings (Cashr).  
Equation (3) will test the hypothesis 1 with the null hypothesis of 𝜃 = 0. 𝜃𝑖 is the 
variable of interest and is expected positive according to the trade-off model and the 
hypothesis. Equation 3 can show the relationship between the change in cash holdings and 
the exposure to the macroeconomic uncertainties but it may not be able to tell how firm’s 
exposure affects the level of cash holdings. Hence, it is necessary to estimate the exposure 
coefficients for each firm and then to re-visit the equation (3).  
This study postulates that each firm has a different degree of exposure to the 
macroeconomic uncertainties, which consequently influences the level of cash holdings for 
each firm. Hence, the next step in methodology is to find the heterogeneous degree of firms’ 
exposure to the macroeconomic uncertainties, Equation (3) can show the firm’s respond to 
the macroeconomic uncertainties measured by equation (1) and (2) but is insufficient to tell 
how much and whether a firm responses more or less to the macroeconomic uncertainties 
than the other firms do. Therefore, a new equation to differentiate the degree of exposures by 
each firm should be introduced. Firm’s exposure is defined as the exposure of the firm value 
or stock price to the change in macroeconomic conditions. To investigate the true nature of 
exposure to macroeconomic uncertainties, a firm level study may be appropriate. 14 
According to the literature research, there are two commonly used regression models to 
measure firm’s exposure, one of which is one-factor model used by Adler and Dumas (1984). 
                                           
14 Choi and Prasad (1995) states that a firm-level study is necessary to understand whether, and why, individual 
firms display varying sensitivity to exchange risk.  
 74 
 
The one-factor model assumes that stock returns can be explained by changes in 
macroeconomic variables. The other is two-factor model introduced by Jorion (1990). Jorion 
(1990) claims that the correlation between the exchange rate and other macroeconomic 
variables generates difficulties in interpreting the firm’s exposure to exchange rate and, 
therefore, arguments one additional factor, the return on market portfolio, into one-factor 
model. Addition of the return on the market portfolio may reduce the residual variance. 
However, this study adopts the one-factor model to measure the exposure to macroeconomic 
uncertainties because the coefficient for the total macroeconomic uncertainties in the one-
factor model can sufficiently capture the exposure from the macroeconomic uncertainties if a 
sufficiently large set of macroeconomic variables, as one index, is considered in the one-
factor model.15 Hence, the time-series regression equation to measure the firm’s exposure to 
macroeconomic uncertainties is as follows, following Adler and Dumas (1984) and Crowley 
and Habibdoust (2013).  
𝑅𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛿𝑖√ℎ𝑡 + 𝜖𝑖,𝑡     (4) 
, where 𝑅𝑖,𝑡 stands for the firm i’s stock return at time t, √ℎ𝑡  is the measure of 
macroeconomic uncertainties, and 𝜖𝑖,𝑡 denotes the white noise error term. Most importantly, 
𝛿𝑖 is firm i’s heterogeneous exposure to macroeconomic uncertainties, meaning that 𝛿𝑖 
shows the firm’s exposure of stock return to macroeconomic uncertainties. Once the 
coefficients for exposures to macroeconomic uncertainties are estimated, the sample is 
divided into 4 quartiles and will be analyzed whether effects of macroeconomic uncertainties 
for firms in one quartile can differ from those for firms in the other quartiles. This equation (4) 
makes this research distinguishable to the other and previous research. In that, compared 
                                           
15 For firms, the Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti (ADS) business conditions index can be applied so one factor model 
may be a relevant model.  
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against previous research which tries to explain the change in cash holdings by firm-specific 
variables, this paper applies the macroeconomic uncertainties as additional variables. More 
importantly, compared with Baum et al. (2006) which assumes homogeneity in firms’ 
exposure to macroeconomic uncertainties, this paper assumes heterogeneity which is more 
relevant, asserting that due to firm’s characteristics firms should have the different degree of 
reaction to the macroeconomic uncertainties. Additionally, this paper is distinguished from 
Gao and Grinstein (2014). Although Gao and Grinstein (2014) assume the heterogeneity in 
firm’s exposure to macroeconomic uncertainties so applies three different measures for 
macroeconomic uncertainties of dispersion in prime rate, the six-month-ahead forecast 
dispersion with regard to real prime rate, uncertainty in GDP, the market beta of a firm times 
the forecast dispersion of GDP growth, and uncertainty in economic policy, the average 
Economic Policy Uncertainty Index. However, among three measures, uncertainty in GDP is 
the sole measure that applies the firm-level difference while the other two fail to apply 
heterogeneity and the firm-level difference is not applied to see if there is the difference in 
the level of cash holding for each individual firms due to the difference. This paper applies 
the complete heterogeneity in firm’s exposure to macroeconomic uncertainties by using the 
GARCH model, a regression model to estimate firm’s exposure, following Adler and Dumas 
(1984) and Crowley and Habibdoust (2013), and the macroeconomic conditions index.  
 Hypothesis 2 is tested by revisiting equation (3) for each quartile and the coefficients on 
macroeconomic uncertainty measure are compared. As a part of testing hypothesis 2, this 
paper examines if the cross-sectional differences in cash holdings can be explained by the 
exposure coefficient to the macroeconomic uncertainties. Hence, the marginal mean 
difference test, after controlling the other variables, is introduced and the following cross-
sectional regression is implemented.  
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𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛿0 + 𝜑𝜗𝑖 + 𝜏(𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑉𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑎𝑏𝑙𝑒𝑠)   (5)  
,where 𝐶𝑎𝑠ℎ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑖,𝑡 is the cash holdings for firm i at time t. 𝜗𝑖 is the rank variable 
for each firm according to the coefficient, 𝛿𝑖, measured by equation (4), indicating that a firm 
is assigned 1 if a firm is in the top quartile by the coefficient, 𝛿𝑖 and 4 if one is in the bottom 
quartile. Hence, 1 means that firms in rank 1 are the most sensitive to the macroeconomic 
uncertainties and 4 means the lowest sensitivity. Equation (5) will test for the whole sample. 
The test results will be able to explain if the exposure to the macroeconomic uncertainties 
tells about the change in cash holdings and if firms with higher exposure to the 
macroeconomic uncertainties would have the higher level of cash holdings. Coefficient of 
interest is 𝜑 of each quartile to find out the ability to explain the difference in cash holdings 
by coefficients. Firms in one quartile are respectively used as the reference to compared with 
the other firms in the other quartiles. 
Data 
First of all, to test the hypothesis 1 and 2, ADS business conditions index is applied for 
𝑋𝑡 in equation (1). The ADS index itself can represent the macroeconomic condition because 
it is designed to track real business conditions at high frequency. Its underlying economic 
indicators are seasonally adjusted and consist of weekly initial jobless claims, monthly 
payroll employment, industrial production, personal income less transfer payments, 
manufacturing and trade sales, and quarterly real GDP, all of which blend high- and low-
frequency information and stock and flow data. To measure the time-varying macroeconomic 
uncertainties for firms, the ADS index may be sufficient as the representation of the 
macroeconomic conditions. However, to confirm the impact of the macroeconomic 
uncertainties on firms’ cash holdings behavior, two alternatives are additionally applied: GDP 
growth and TED index. TED spread, provided by the Federal Reserve Bank at St. Louis, is 
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measured as the percentage difference between 3-month LIBOR and 3-month T-Bill rate. It is 
an indicator of the liquidity or the healthiness of the banking system and the increase in TED 
spread means the decrease in liquidity and the increase in the default risk at the financial 
market. Hence, since TED spread can indicate the condition of the financial market, 
especially in liquidity, it may work as an alternative to the ADS index. This study uses 
Compustat for firm-level data and only includes firms that have at least $5 million in assets 
and market capitalization. Financial firms and utilities are eliminated since those firms are 
governed by regulating entities hence their financial decisions including cash holdings can be 
influenced by those entities.  
This study differs from the previous literature. In that, firms are assumed to have 
different levels of exposure to the macroeconomic uncertainties. Equation (4) applies stock 
returns data for each firm from Compustat to measure different exposure levels for firms and, 
eventually, to test if changes in cash holdings would be impacted by different levels of 
exposures to macroeconomic uncertainties. The ADSI is utilized to measure the 
macroeconomic uncertainties and applied to the equation (1) since the ADSI includes the 
general business and economic condition. However, three additional alternatives are also 
introduced to compare and confirm the test result by the ADSI. More specifically, GDP 
growth rate and TED spread are employed. Then, volatility of GDP growth rate, conditional 
volatility of GDP growth rate estimated by ARMA-GARCH model, and conditional volatility 
of TED spread also estimated by ARMA_GARCH model are respectively introduced in 
equation (1) to measure the macroeconomic uncertainties.  
Dependent variable is the cash holdings of the firm. Following Bates et al (2009) and 
Gao and Grinstein (2014), this paper measures the cash holdings as the ratio of cash and 
marketable securities to total assets. As stated above, main explanatory variable is the 
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macroeconomic uncertainty presented by four different measures and measured with three 
different variables. Along with the explanatory variables, firm-level variables are employed to 
control for the impact on the cash holdings. Following Bate et al (2009) and Gao and 
Grinstein (2014), this paper applies Market-to-book ratio (MB), firm size (Size), cash flow to 
asset (CashF), net working capital to asset (NWC), investment (Inv), leverage (Lev), 
dividend payout dummy (Div), and acquisition (Acq) as control variables as well as the 
lagged value of cash holdings (Cashr). Firm size is measured as the logarithm of book value 
of assets. Market-to-book is estimated as the ratio of total assets excluding book value of 
equity and including market value of equity to total assets. The leverage is measured as the 
long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities divided by book value of assets. Cash flow to 
assets is measured as earnings after interest, dividend, and taxes but before depreciation 
divided by book value of assets. Net working capital to asset is current assets less cash and 
marketable securities less current liabilities divided by book value of asset. Investment is 
measured as the ratio of capital expenditure to book value of assets. Dividend payout is a 
dummy which equals to one in years when a firm pays a common dividend. Otherwise, the 
dummy equals zero.  
Table 2.1 provides the definition of control variables and macroeconomic variables and 
equations to measure them. Data for control variables is winsorized at 1% and 99%. In order 
to have less exclusion of the data, leverage variable is not restricted.  
Table 2.2 shows the statistical summary description on firm-level variables and 
macroeconomic uncertainty variables. There are 5,244 firms and 82,784 observations in the 
data which spans from 1971 to 2013. It is quarterly basis data. However, among 4 
macroeconomic variables, TED has observations less than the others because TED has been 
measured from 1981. Two macroeconomic uncertainty variables of GDPgrv and GDPgrcv 
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seem to show the same magnitude as their base variable is the same as the GDP growth rate. 
In the meantime, the other two uncertainty variables, uncertainties by ADSI and TED, seem 
to have the similar impact as the one standard deviation above mean for both variables is 
similar although the mean of uncertainty by ADSI is negative. The negative mean may 
indicate that the business condition would not go to the same direction as the other measures 
would do when there is an unexpected economic event. That business condition would 
fluctuate more when additional unexpected event happens in the economy since standard 
deviation is higher than the others.  
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Table 2.1. Variable Description 
 
  
This table shows how variables are originated and computed. Control variables and dependent variable, 
Cashr, are computed with COMPUSTAT. Four different measurements for macroeconomic uncertainties are 
computed. GDPgrv is the volatility of GDP growth rate, GDPgrcv is the conditional volatility of GDP growth 
rate. ADSI is the conditional volatility of ADS index and TED is the conditional volatility of TED spread. 
Conditional volatility is calculated by ARMA-GARCH model. 
      
Variable Description 
   
Firm Level Variables  
Cashr Cash Ratio, Ratio of cash and marketable securities to total assets: CHE/AT  
L.Cashr Lagged Cash Ratio 
MB Market to Book ratio, Ratio of total assets adjusted by market value for equity to total 
assets: (AT-CEQ+PRCC_F*CSHO)/AT 
Size Firm Size, Logarithm of book value of total assets: LOG10(AT) 
CashF Cash Flow to Assets, Earnings before interest and tax before depreciation divided by 
book value of total assets: (OIBDP-XINT-TXT-DVC)/AT 
NWC Net Working Capital to Assets, Current assets excluding cash and marketable 
securities less current liabilities, divided by book value of total assets: (WCAP-
CHE)/AT 
Inv Capital expenditures to Assets, Ratio of capital expenditure to book value of total 
assets: CAPX/AT 
Lev Leverage, Ratio of short-term and long-term debt to total asset: (DLTT+DLC)/AT 
Div Dividend Payout Dummy: 1 if DVC > 0 or if positive dividend is reported 
Acq Acquisitions to Assets, Ratio of total acquisition to total assets or 0 if missing: 
AQC/AT 
  
 
Macroeconomic Variables  
GDPgrv Variance of GDP growth rate 
GDPgrcv Conditional variance of GDP growth rate estimated from GARCH(1,1) model 
ADSI Conditional variance of Aruoba-Diebold-Scott business conditions (ADS) index: 
Provided by Philadelphia Fed, it consists of jobless claims, payroll employment, 
industrial production, personal income less transfer payments, manufacturing and 
trade sales, and real GDP 
TED TED spread: Provided by the Fed at St. Louis, it is the difference between 3-month 
LIBOR and 3-month T-bill interest rate.  
      
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 81 
 
Table 2.2. Variable Summary Statistics    
      
This table shows the summary statistics for control variables and 4 different macroeconomic uncertainty 
variables. Cashr to Acq are control variables measured by the equations shown at Table 2.1. GDPgrv is the 
volatility measured by the GDP growth rate, GDPgrcv is the conditional volatility measured by the GDP 
growth rate with ARMA-GARCH model. ADSI and TED are Aruoba-Diebold-Scotti (ADS) business 
conditions index and TED spread, respectively. Each is applied to ARMA-GARCH model to find the 
uncertainty measure, the conditional volatility, for each variable. These 4 measures are variables of interest. 
Cashr is the ratio of cash and marketable securities to total assets. It is the dependent variable. 
           
Variable N Mean Median Std Dev  
      
Firm Level Variables      
Cashr 82784 0.19046 0.10054 0.22255  
MB 82784 2.95501 1.45531 10.99142  
Size 82784 2.01838 1.94092 1.06037  
CashF 82784 -0.13706 0.06048 1.64402  
NWC 82784 -0.06510 0.12142 5.20073  
Inv 82784 0.05784 0.04205 0.06074  
Lev 82784 0.33064 0.18578 4.06506  
Div 82784 0.35724 0.00000 0.47919  
Acq 82784 0.01555 0.00000 0.05461  
      
Macroeconomic Variables      
GDPgrv 82784 0.08240 0.03581 0.11074  
GDPgrcv 82784 0.10834 0.06927 0.08267  
ADSI 82784 -0.12020 0.09910 1.01591  
TED 62862 0.60878 0.51000 0.35994  
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Test Result 
Table 2.3 shows the pooled regression result of cash holdings on each different 
macroeconomic uncertainty measure and control variables. Pooled regression can usually be 
carried out on time series data for different cross sections. By applying the whole sample, 
pooled regression aims to show whether macroeconomic uncertainties have impact on the 
level of cash holdings. It is to test the hypothesis 1 and is expected to have positive 
coefficients for macroeconomic uncertainties. Equation (1) and (2) are employed to generate 
the macroeconomic uncertainty variables, using GDP growth rate, ADS index, and TED 
spread. Later, equation (3) is applied to see how and how much control variables and 
macroeconomic uncertainty variables can explain the change in cash holdings.  
Column (1) shows the result of the base model with only all control variables. All control 
variables except the firm size are statistically significant, which is consistent with Gao and 
Grinstein (2014). Test results with each macroeconomic uncertainty variable are shown at 
column (2) through (5). Column (2) and (3) show the test results with macroeconomic 
uncertainty measures by GDP growth rate. While all control variables except size are still 
significant, two GDP growth rate-related uncertainty measures are not significant hence does 
not seem to have impact on firm’s cash holdings. Column (4) shows the test result with the 
macroeconomic uncertainty by ADS index. Macroeconomic uncertainty by ADS index has a 
positive and significant effect on firm’s cash holdings and its sign is as expected in 
hypothesis 1. So, firms may plan to have more cash holdings when the macroeconomic 
uncertainty is (is expected to be) high. Last column (5) shows the test result with the 
macroeconomic uncertainty by TED spread. The coefficient is negative and significant, 
meaning that macroeconomic uncertainty contributes negatively to firm’s cash holdings. It is 
noted that the number of observation for column (5) is smaller than the other columns and the 
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sign of the coefficient is negative. Since TED spread has been measured from 1981, total 
number of observation is smaller. TED spread is negatively related with the level of cash 
holdings. In that, the decrease in TED spread indicates the decrease in difference between 
LIBOR and T-bill rate, leading the decrease in interest rates and the increase in liquidity. The 
decrease in interest rates, consequently, means the increase in external financing with cheaper 
cost of borrowing hence the increase in the internal cash holdings for the precautionary 
motive in the future. Overall, although two measures for macroeconomic uncertainty fail to 
show the relationship with the cash holdings, the other two, especially one with ADS index, 
show the supportive test result. However, in order to capture the fixed effects on firms’ 
heterogeneity regarding the behavior of cash holdings and uncertainty measurements, fixed 
effect regression model is applied.  
Table 2.4 shows the fixed effect regression test result. Throughout test results in all 
columns, firm size is still the sole insignificant control variable. So, firm’s decision making 
process related with cash holdings does not seem affected by the size of the firm, which is 
supportive test result on the data cleaning process of not excluding small firms from the 
sample while Gao and Grinstein (2014) put on restriction on firm size to have top 25% largest 
corporation by total asset. All macroeconomic uncertainty variables are significant hence 
seem to contribute the firm’s cash holdings decision and support the hypothesis. Table 2.4 
shows the evidence in favor of two motives: transaction cost and precautionary motives. 
Macroeconomic uncertainties by GDP growth rate and ADS index represent the real economy. 
When macroeconomic uncertainty by real economic variables rises, firms tend to have more 
cash to hedge the cash shortfalls in the future, which significance of the coefficient for 
macroeconomic uncertainty variables in column (2) to (4) can support. To reduce transaction 
cost and to use cash as internal source of fund, firms need more cash holdings. As 
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macroeconomic uncertainty by TED spread decreases, firms can have more cash holdings 
because the lower the uncertainty, the higher the liquidity in the financial market and the 
cheaper the external finance. So, firms can save more cash holdings by enjoying cheaper 
external finance. On the contrary, firms can use cash holdings to finance projects in order to 
have the transaction cost instead of using external finance with higher cost of borrowing 
when the uncertainty is high. Hypothesis 1 is confirmed that firms tend to have more cash 
holdings as they perceive more macroeconomic uncertainty as all tested macroeconomic 
uncertainties are significant.  
However, still Table 2.4 fails to explain if the heterogeneity in firm’s exposure to the 
macroeconomic uncertainty makes the difference in cash holdings. Equation (4) is applied to 
measure the heterogeneous degree of firm’s exposure to macroeconomic uncertainties. It is 
found that each firm has a different degree of exposure to a macroeconomic uncertainty 
variable measured by ADS index. Then, firms are distinguished into 4 quartiles based on their 
computed exposure degree. Top quartile (25%) consists of firms with exposure degree higher 
than 0.14, the second quartile (25%-50%) firms with exposure degree between 0.14 and 
0.053, the third quartile firms with exposure degree between 0.053 and 0.0038, and lastly, the 
bottom quartile firms with exposure lower than 0.0038.  
Regression test results for each quartile are in table 2.5 to 8. Among control variables in 
top 3 quartiles, unlike the results on pooled and fixed effect regressions, firm size is 
positively significant so can contribute to the change in firms’ cash holdings. Instead, 
dividend payout does not seem related with the level of cash holding, although dividend 
payment seems directly and negatively related with the level of cash holdings, intuitively 
speaking: i.e. if a firm pays dividend to common shareholders, its cash holdings would 
decrease. It is shown that firms which are less sensitive to the economic uncertainty for the 
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Table 2.3. Pooled Regression 
      
       This table shows the result of pooled regression of cash holdings on control variables and 4 different 
measures of macroeconomic uncertainty. The dependent variable is Cashr, the ratio of cash and marketable 
securities to total assets. Column (1) shows the base regression result without macroeconomic uncertainty 
measure, column (2) shows the regression result with the GDPgr volatility, column (3) shows the regression 
result with the GDPgr conditional volatility, column (4) shows the regression result with the conditional 
volatility measured with ADS index, and column (5) shows the regression result with the conditional 
volatility measured with TED spread. 
Coefficients are shown and t-stat is in parenthesis.  
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
              
Variables   (1) 
Base 
(2) 
GDP 
Growth 
(3) 
GDP Growth 
under GARCH 
(4) 
ADSI 
(5) 
TED 
       Intercept 
 
0.0657*** 0.0662*** 0.0668*** 0.0659*** 0.0781*** 
  
(57.71) (55.01) (50.77) (57.91) (46.45) 
Macroeconomic Variables 
 
     
GDPgrv 
 
 
-0.0050 
   
  
 
(-1.31) 
   
GDPgrcv 
 
  
-0.0087 
  
  
  
(-1.68) 
  
ADSI 
 
   
0.0038*** 
 
  
   
(9.53) 
 
TED 
 
    
-0.0129*** 
  
    
(-9.18) 
Firm Characteristic Variables      
L.Cashr 
 
0.8212*** 0.8210*** 0.8209*** 0.8215*** 0.8209*** 
  
(420.84) (419.19) (418.44) (421.17) (372.21) 
MB 
 
0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0003*** 
  
(9.25) (9.20) (9.17) (9.10) (6.97) 
Size 
 
-0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0000 -0.0010 
  
(-0.35) (-0.53) (-0.65) (-0.02) (-1.79) 
CashF 
 
0.0036*** 0.0036*** 0.0036*** 0.0035*** 0.0033*** 
  
(10.12) (10.14) (10.16) (9.83) (8.54) 
NWC 
 
-0.0017*** -0.0017*** -0.0017*** -0.0017*** -0.0013*** 
  
(-8.12) (-8.11) (-8.11) (-8.16) (-5.57) 
Inv 
 
-0.3303*** -0.3298*** -0.3293*** -0.3313*** -0.3586*** 
  
(-48.63) (-48.49) (-48.33) (-48.80) (-41.38) 
Lev 
 
-0.0021*** -0.0021*** -0.0021*** -0.0021*** -0.0016*** 
  
(-8.34) (-8.32) (-8.31) (-8.39) (-5.76) 
Div 
 
-0.0193*** -0.0191*** -0.0189*** -0.0194*** -0.0181*** 
  
(-19.65) (-19.03) (-18.71) (-19.70) (-13.74) 
Acq 
 
-0.3937*** -0.3942*** -0.3943*** -0.3949*** -0.4026*** 
  
(-52.21) (-52.21) (-52.23) (-52.38) (-47.60) 
  
     
R2 
 
72.13% 72.13% 72.13% 72.16% 72.53% 
Number of Observations 
 
82784 82784 82784 82784 62862 
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Table 2.4. Panel Regression 
             
This table shows the result of panel regression with fixed effect of cash holdings on control variables and 4 
different measures of macroeconomic uncertainty. The dependent variable is Cashr, the ratio of cash and 
marketable securities to total assets. Column (1) shows the base regression result without macroeconomic 
uncertainty measure, column (2) shows the regression result with the GDPgr volatility, column (3) shows the 
regression result with the GDPgr conditional volatility, column (4) shows the regression result with the 
conditional volatility measured with ADS index, and column (5) shows the regression result with the 
conditional volatility measured with TED spread. 
Coefficients are shown and t-stat is in parenthesis.  
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
              
 Variables   (1) 
Base 
(2) 
GDP Growth 
(3) 
GDP Growth 
under 
GARCH 
(4) 
ADSI 
(5) 
TED 
 
        Macroeconomic Variables 
 
     
 GDPgrv 
 
 
0.0149*** 
   
 
  
 
(3.77) 
   
 GDPgrcv 
 
  
0.0407*** 
  
 
  
  
(7.10) 
  
 ADSI 
 
   
0.0049*** 
 
 
  
   
(12.71) 
 
 TED 
 
    
-0.0039*** 
 
  
    
(-2.77) 
 Firm Characteristic Variables 
     
 L.Cashr 
 
0.5163*** 0.5166*** 0.5165*** 0.5159*** 0.5067*** 
 
  
(157.85) (157.91) (157.96) (157.86) (135.48) 
 MB 
 
0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 
 
  
(7.77) (7.84) (7.97) (7.47) (6.58) 
 Size 
 
-0.0018 -0.0011 -0.0001 -0.0011 0.0000 
 
  
(-1.64) (-1.05) (-0.11) (-1.06) (-0.02) 
 CashF 
 
0.0053*** 0.0053*** 0.0052*** 0.0052*** 0.0047*** 
 
  
(13.47) (13.42) (13.35) (13.13) (11.12) 
 NWC 
 
-0.0014*** -0.0014*** -0.0014*** -0.0014*** -0.0009*** 
 
  
(-6.06) (-6.05) (-6.04) (-6.08) (-3.82) 
 Inv 
 
-0.3190*** -0.3198*** -0.3217*** -0.3188*** -0.3483*** 
 
  
(-39.23) (-39.31) (-39.52) (-39.23) (-33.62) 
 Lev 
 
-0.0015*** -0.0015*** -0.0015*** -0.0015*** -0.0010*** 
 
  
(-5.40) (-5.41) (-5.41) (-5.42) (-3.31) 
 Div 
 
0.0041** 0.0037** 0.0032** 0.0045*** 0.0034 
 
  
(2.54) (2.26) (1.98) (2.77) (1.56) 
 Acq 
 
-0.3471*** -0.3464*** -0.3460*** -0.3487*** -0.3547*** 
 
  
(-44.89) (-44.80) (-44.76) (-45.15) (-40.62) 
 
  
     
 R2 
 
24.13% 24.14% 24.17% 24.27% 23.63% 
 Number of Observations 
 
82784 82784 82784 82784 62862 
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level of cash holdings may not change the cash holdings by their leverage condition and 
NWC condition. However, NWC and leverage condition become important for more 
sensitive firms as they are statistically significant in test results from third quartile to top 
quartile. Regardless of the difference in the degree of exposure to macroeconomic uncertainty, 
macroeconomic uncertainty by ADS index is positively significant so can contribute the 
change in the level of firms’ cash holdings. Overall, Table 2.4 and 2.5 can tell that the 
macroeconomic uncertainty variable is important and has significant influence on the cash 
holdings. And also, it may tell that firms with the different level of exposure have the 
different influence on cash holding.  
Test results by GDPgrv and GDPgrcv in table 2.6 and 2.7 show that firms with the lower 
exposure take macroeconomic variables into consideration in the cash holdings decision since 
firms with less exposure to macroeconomic uncertainty in third and bottom quartile have the 
significant impact. Firms in top quartile seem indifferent to GDP-originated uncertainties. 
Consistent with the result in table 2.5, firm-specific factors except dividend are significant to 
the behavior of cash holdings. Although leverage and NWC are not significant for firms in 
bottom quartiles, they become important to explain the change in cash holdings for firms in 
the other quartiles. Firms in the top quartiles only have influence from the macroeconomic 
uncertainty by TED spread in table 2.8. Intuitively, it makes sense that firms in the top 
quartiles should respond to the uncertainty by the TED spread at the financial market before 
firms in the other quartiles respond because those firms are the most sensitive ones to the 
macroeconomic changes. Test result with macroeconomic uncertainty by TED in table 2.8 
may partially show that the higher the exposure, the more cash holdings because only firms in 
top quartile have the significant impact of macroeconomic uncertainty on the cash holdings. 
Consistent with previous findings, dividend is the sole firm-specific factor that is not  
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Table 2.5. Panel Regression of each quartile for macroeconomic uncertainty by ADS index  
 
This table shows the result of panel regression with fixed effect of cash holdings on control variables and a 
measure of macroeconomic uncertainty computed with ADS index. The dependent variable is Cashr, the ratio 
of cash and marketable securities to total assets. Column (1) shows the fixed effect regression result for the top 
25% firms, column (2) shows the fixed effect regression result for the second top 25% firms, column (3) 
shows the fixed effect regression result for the third top 25% firms, and column (4) shows the fixed effect 
regression result for the bottom 25% firms. Quartiles are distinguished by firm’s exposure degree measured by 
the equation (4). Firms are in the top quartile with exposure degree greater than 0.14, in the second top quartile 
with exposure degree between 0.14 and 0.053, in the third top quartile with exposure degree between 0.053 
and 0.0038, and in the bottom quartile with exposure degree smaller than 0.0038. 
Coefficients are shown and t-stat is in parenthesis.  
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
           
Variables   (1) 
Top Quartile 
(2) 
2nd Quartile 
(3) 
3rd Quartile 
(4) 
4th Quartile 
      Macroeconomic Variables 
 
    
ADSI 
 
0.0039*** 0.0034*** 0.0059*** 0.0041*** 
  
(7.11) (5.15) (6.66) (4.25) 
  
    
Firm Characteristic Variables     
L.Cashr 
 
0.5262*** 0.5326*** 0.4887*** 0.4882*** 
  
(84.82) (84.20) (73.98) (72.65) 
MB 
 
0.0006*** 0.0008*** 0.0009*** 0.0004*** 
  
(4.96) (8.47) (7.28) (4.02) 
Size 
 
-0.0193*** -0.0105*** 0.0160*** 0.0053** 
  
(-13.08) (-5.46) (5.77) (2.08) 
CashF 
 
-0.0099*** 0.0346*** 0.0054*** 0.0035*** 
  
(-3.47) (16.96) (6.26) (6.13) 
NWC 
 
-0.0642*** -0.0477*** -0.0018*** -0.0004 
  
(-19.19) (-22.82) (-3.58) (-1.28) 
Inv 
 
-0.4338*** -0.3435*** -0.2933 -0.2854*** 
  
(-27.86) (-21.46) (-17.77) (-17.65) 
Lev 
 
-0.1054*** -0.0945*** -0.0199*** -0.0003 
  
(-25.60) (-26.06) (-10.31) (-0.90) 
Div 
 
0.0012 0.0024 0.0080 -0.0013 
  
(0.53) (0.91) (2.14) (-0.31) 
Acq 
 
-0.3301*** -0.3254*** -0.3541*** -0.3469*** 
  
(-28.90) (-24.79) (-19.29) (-19.67) 
  
    
R2 
 
33.36% 30.79% 22.94% 21.13% 
Number of Observations 
 
20668 20669 20697 20700 
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Table 2.6. Panel Regression of each quartile for macroeconomic uncertainty by GDP growth rate 
volatility 
 
This table shows the result of panel regression with fixed effect of cash holdings on control variables and a 
measure of macroeconomic uncertainty computed with GDP growth rate, the volatility of the GDP growth 
rate. The dependent variable is Cashr, the ratio of cash and marketable securities to total assets. Column (1) 
shows the fixed effect regression result for the top 25% firms, column (2) shows the fixed effect regression 
result for the second top 25% firms, column (3) shows the fixed effect regression result for the third top 25% 
firms, and column (4) shows the fixed effect regression result for the bottom 25% firms. Quartiles are 
distinguished by firm’s exposure degree measured by the equation (4). Firms are in the top quartile with 
exposure degree greater than 0.14, in the second top quartile with exposure degree between 0.14 and 0.053, 
in the third top quartile with exposure degree between 0.053 and 0.0038, and in the bottom quartile with 
exposure degree smaller than 0.0038. 
Coefficients are shown and t-stat is in parenthesis.  
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
            
Variables   (1) 
Top Quartile 
(2) 
2nd Quartile 
(3) 
3rd Quartile 
(4) 
4th Quartile 
      Macroeconomic Variables 
 
    
GDPgrv 
 
-0.0034 0.0125 0.0195** 0.0289*** 
  
(-0.61) (1.89) (2.13) (2.96) 
  
    
Firm Characteristic Variables     
L.Cashr 
 
0.5267*** 0.5337*** 0.4891*** 0.4882*** 
  
(84.78) (84.30) (73.95) (72.63) 
MB 
 
0.0006*** 0.0008*** 0.0009*** 0.0004*** 
  
(5.21) (8.72) (7.65) (4.03) 
Size 
 
-0.0200*** -0.0101*** 0.0161*** 0.0049 
  
(-13.28) (-5.18) (5.77) (1.93) 
CashF 
 
-0.0094*** 0.0350*** 0.0056*** 0.0035*** 
  
(-3.29) (17.15) (6.51) (6.16) 
NWC 
 
-0.0646*** -0.0481*** -0.0017*** -0.0004 
  
(-19.30) (-23.01) (-3.41) (-1.30) 
Inv 
 
-0.4346*** -0.3437*** -0.2933*** -0.2892*** 
  
(-27.88) (-21.46) (-17.68) (-17.87) 
Lev 
 
-0.1070*** -0.0953*** -0.0121*** -0.0004 
  
(-25.97) (-26.30) (-10.41) (-0.94) 
Div 
 
0.0011 0.0018 0.0068 -0.0030 
  
(0.48) (0.68) (1.82) (-0.72) 
Acq 
 
-0.3275*** -0.3234*** -0.3521*** -0.3456*** 
  
(-28.63) (-24.63) (-19.16) (-19.59) 
   
   
R2 
 
33.20% 30.72% 22.80% 21.09% 
Number of Observations 
 
20668 20669 20697 20700 
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Table 2.7. Panel Regression of each quartile for macroeconomic uncertainty by GDP growth rate 
conditional volatility 
 
This table shows the result of panel regression with fixed effect of cash holdings on control variables and a 
measure of macroeconomic uncertainty computed with GDP growth rate, the conditional volatility of the GDP 
growth rate. The dependent variable is Cashr, the ratio of cash and marketable securities to total assets. 
Column (1) shows the fixed effect regression result for the top 25% firms, column (2) shows the fixed effect 
regression result for the second top 25% firms, column (3) shows the fixed effect regression result for the third 
top 25% firms, and column (4) shows the fixed effect regression result for the bottom 25% firms. Quartiles are 
distinguished by firm’s exposure degree measured by the equation (4). Firms are in the top quartile with 
exposure degree greater than 0.14, in the second top quartile with exposure degree between 0.14 and 0.053, in 
the third top quartile with exposure degree between 0.053 and 0.0038, and in the bottom quartile with 
exposure degree smaller than 0.0038. 
Coefficients are shown and t-stat is in parenthesis.  
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
            
Variables   (1) 
Top Quartile 
(2) 
2nd Quartile 
(3) 
3rd Quartile 
(4) 
4th Quartile 
      Macroeconomic Variables 
 
    
GDPgrcv 
 
0.0065 0.0278*** 0.0506*** 0.0683*** 
  
(0.79) (2.85) (3.80) (4.91) 
  
    
Firm Characteristic Variables     
L.Cashr 
 
0.5269*** 0.5338*** 0.4891*** 0.4877*** 
  
(84.82) (84.34) (73.98) (72.58) 
MB 
 
0.0006*** 0.0008*** 0.0009*** 0.0004*** 
  
(5.26) (8.74) (7.70) (4.06) 
Size 
 
-0.0195*** -0.0093*** 0.0171*** 0.0055** 
  
(-12.63) (-4.68) (6.09) (2.19) 
CashF 
 
-0.0095*** 0.0350*** 0.0056*** 0.0035*** 
  
(-3.31) (17.12) (6.47) (6.12) 
NWC 
 
-0.0647*** -0.0482*** -0.0017*** -0.0004 
  
(-19.33) (-23.03) (-3.42) (-1.27) 
Inv 
 
-0.4345 -0.3448*** -0.2948*** -0.2929*** 
  
(-27.87) (-21.52) (-17.82) (-18.08) 
Lev 
 
-0.1069*** -0.0953*** -0.0120*** -0.0003 
  
(-25.96) (-26.31) (-10.40) (-0.92) 
Div 
 
0.0009 0.0015 0.0064 -0.0039 
  
(0.41) (0.57) (1.70) (-0.95) 
Acq 
 
-0.3269*** -0.3231*** -0.3520*** -0.3458*** 
  
(-28.59) (-24.60) (-19.16) (-19.61) 
  
    
R2 
 
33.20% 30.73% 22.83% 21.15% 
Number of Observations 
 
20668 20669 20697 20700 
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Table 2.8. Panel Regression of each quartile for macroeconomic uncertainty by TED spread 
 
This table shows the result of panel regression with fixed effect of cash holdings on control variables and a 
measure of macroeconomic uncertainty computed with TED. The dependent variable is Cashr, the ratio of cash 
and marketable securities to total assets. Column (1) shows the fixed effect regression result for the top 25% 
firms, column (2) shows the fixed effect regression result for the second top 25% firms, column (3) shows the 
fixed effect regression result for the third top 25% firms, and column (4) shows the fixed effect regression 
result for the bottom 25% firms. Quartiles are distinguished by firm’s exposure degree measured by the 
equation (4). Firms are in the top quartile with exposure degree greater than 0.14, in the second top quartile 
with exposure degree between 0.14 and 0.053, in the third top quartile with exposure degree between 0.053 
and 0.0038, and in the bottom quartile with exposure degree smaller than 0.0038. 
Coefficients are shown and t-stat is in parenthesis.  
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
            
Variables   (1) 
Top Quartile 
(2) 
2nd Quartile 
(3) 
3rd Quartile 
(4) 
4th Quartile 
      Macroeconomic Variables 
 
    
TED 
 
-0.0065*** 0.0005 -0.0047 0.0001 
  
(-3.07) (0.19) (-1.49) (0.05) 
Firm Characteristic Variables     
L.Cashr 
 
0.5204*** 0.5283*** 0.4785*** 0.4822*** 
  
(72.24) (70.12) (63.96) (65.30) 
MB 
 
0.0005*** 0.0008*** 0.0009*** 0.0004*** 
  
(4.23) (7.53) (6.86) (3.62) 
Size 
 
-0.0305*** -0.0169*** 0.0232*** 0.0105*** 
  
(-13.51) (-5.71) (6.67) (3.48) 
CashF 
 
-0.0100*** 0.0331*** 0.0049*** 0.0030*** 
  
(-3.23) (14.50) (5.28) (5.08) 
NWC 
 
-0.0443*** -0.0391*** -0.0013** -0.0002 
  
(-11.83) (-16.41) (-2.40) (-0.62) 
Inv 
 
-0.4993*** -0.4137*** -0.3239*** -0.3112*** 
  
(-24.15) (-18.30) (-15.47) (-16.36) 
Lev 
 
-0.0977*** -0.0814*** -0.0104*** -0.0001 
  
(-20.35) (-19.14) (-8.38) (-0.33) 
Div 
 
0.0022 0.0044 0.0054 -0.0030 
  
(0.77) (1.12) (1.03) (-0.56) 
Acq 
 
-0.3434*** -0.3213*** -0.3631*** -0.3571*** 
  
(-26.35) (-21.18) (-17.75) (-18.49) 
  
    
R2 
 
32.44% 29.84% 24.29% 20.85% 
Number of Observations 
 
15369 14512 15969 17012 
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statistically significant regardless of how macroeconomic uncertainties are measured.  
Although hypothesis 2 is confirmed since the test result with ADSI shows coefficients 
are significant for all quartiles and is marginally supported by the test result with the other 
macroeconomic variables, it is still not evident if firms with higher exposure would have 
higher level of cash holdings. To test it, equation (5) is applied to see the difference in cash 
holdings by firms’ different exposure to macroeconomic uncertainty. Test result is shown in 
Table 2.9.  
It is the marginal mean difference test after controlling other variables. It shows how 
much the difference between two means is with the top, second, and third quartiles as the 
reference, respectively. For example, when macroeconomic uncertainty is measured by 
GDPgrv, the mean difference between top quartile and second quartile is -0.0027, indicating 
that the mean of GDPgrv coefficient for top quartile is 0.0027 larger on average than that of 
second quartile and the difference is statistically significant. It can tell that firms in top 
quartile have more change in cash holdings than those in second quartile for the same level of 
the macroeconomic uncertainty by GDPgrv. When second quartile is used as the reference, 
the mean difference between second quartile and third quartile is -0.0035 and the difference 
are significant. Firms in second quartiles have more change in cash holdings than those in 
third quartile for the same level of the macroeconomic uncertainty. When third quartile is the 
reference, the difference between third quartile and the bottom quartile is 0.0030 and 
significant. So, firms in the bottom quartile show more change in cash holdings than those in 
third quartile for the same level of the macroeconomic uncertainty. Hence, it can be drawn 
that the top quartile has the highest change in cash holdings when macroeconomic 
uncertainty is in effect and is followed by the 2nd, the bottom and 3rd quartiles, respectively. 
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Table 2.9. Marginal Mean Difference test  
 
Ranking Procedure; Difference in Cash holdings by firms' different exposure after controlling other variables 
This table shows the result of the panel regression of cash holdings on control variables and a measure of 
macroeconomic uncertainty computed with each different macroeconomic variables. The dependent variable is 
Cashr, the ratio of cash and marketable securities to total assets. It is the marginal mean difference test after 
controlling other variables. It shows how much is the difference between two means with the top, second, and 
third quartiles are used as reference, respectively. Reference column is the basis quartile compared with the 
other columns. For example, -0.0027 in Column (1) means that the mean of GDPgrv coefficient for top 
quartile is 0.0027 larger on average than that of second quartile and the difference is statistically significant. 
Using 6 different coefficient values and p-values, it is determined what quartile is better than the others on 
average and if the difference is significant.  
Coefficients are shown and t-stat is in parenthesis.  
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 
     
Variables  Reference (1) 
Second Quartile 
(2) 
Third Quartile 
(3) 
Bottom Quartile 
     Macroeconomic Variables 
   
GDPgrv 
 
   
 
Top Quartile (25%) -0.0027** -0.0062*** -0.0031*** 
  
(-2.25) (-4.82) (-2.48) 
 
Second Quartile  
 
-0.0035*** -0.0004 
   
(-2.94) (-0.38) 
 
Third Quartile 
  
0.0030*** 
    
(2.63) 
     
GDPgrcv 
 
   
 
Top Quartile (25%) -0.0027** -0.0062*** -0.0032*** 
  
(-2.25) (-4.85) (-2.52) 
 
Second Quartile  
 
-0.0035*** -0.0005 
   
(-2.98) (-0.42) 
 
Third Quartile 
  
0.0030*** 
    
(2.62) 
     
ADSI 
 
   
 
Top Quartile (25%) -0.0027** -0.0060*** -0.0030*** 
  
(-2.25) (-4.69) (-2.38) 
 
Second Quartile  
 
-0.0033*** -0.0003 
   
(-2.81) (-0.27) 
 
Third Quartile 
  
0.0030*** 
    
(2.60) 
     
TED 
 
   
 
Top Quartile (25%) -0.0021 -0.0064*** -0.0043*** 
  
(-1.42) (-4.03) (-2.82) 
 
Second Quartile  
 
-0.0042*** -0.0022 
   
(-2.87) (-1.52) 
 
Third Quartile 
  
0.0021*** 
    
(1.49) 
          
     
  
 94 
 
that the top quartile has the highest change in cash holdings when macroeconomic 
uncertainty is in effect and is followed by the 2nd, the bottom and 3rd quartiles, respectively. 
The result for the marginal mean difference test with the other macroeconomic variable 
shows the consistent result.16 Therefore, it can be concluded that the top quartile where there 
are the most sensitive firms to the macroeconomic uncertainty has the highest impact of the 
macroeconomic uncertainty on the cash holdings while the third quartile has the lowest 
impact. Generally, firms with higher degree of exposure to macroeconomic uncertainty have 
more impact on the level of cash holdings that those with lower degree of exposure.  
  
                                           
16 Test result can be presented upon request. 
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Conclusion 
Conclusive remark 
This study aims to clarify the understanding on the relationship between the firm’s cash 
holdings and its causes by introducing the more detailed relationship between cash holdings 
and macroeconomic uncertainty. While previous literature tries to explain the change in the 
level of cash holdings mainly by the firm-level variables with the partial inclusion of 
macroeconomic uncertainty, this study considers the full impact of the macroeconomic 
uncertainty on the change in the level of firms’ cash holdings by understanding and 
introducing the firm’s heterogeneous exposure to macroeconomic uncertainty. Firms’ 
heterogeneity to macroeconomic uncertainty is introduced in the test to see if the 
heterogeneity can tell the difference in the change in the level of cash holdings. This paper 
finds that macroeconomic uncertainties measured by difference macroeconomic condition 
variables are significant and contribute to the change in cash holdings. Additionally, this 
paper shows that the firms’ different level of exposure to macroeconomic uncertainty can 
cause the different degree of cash holdings and that firms with the higher level of exposure 
have the higher level of cash holdings. 
Remark on the future research 
This paper can be improved by examining how a firm’s exposure to global economic 
uncertainties affects a firm’s decision regarding its cash holdings. In doing so, this paper 
expands the parameter for macroeconomic uncertainties toward international level to examine 
if these added international macroeconomic variables such as exchange rates, industrial 
production, and commodity price can help explain firms’ cash holdings behavior across 
countries. Financial markets are interrelated and integrated among the other markets, which 
results in increasing exposure of firms to economic uncertainties from both domestic and 
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international environment. Managers of firms should take international economic 
environment into account for the decision making process for the capital structure. Therefore, 
firms’ cash holdings behavior can be influenced also by international macroeconomic factors. 
Guillou and Schiavo (2011) find the changes in exchange rate result in a liquidity constraint, 
using a dataset of French exporting firms: i.e. Cash flow seems negatively correlated with 
exchange rate movements. Pinkowitz et al. (2012)  show that U.S. firms hold more cash 
than foreign firms by the year 2010, U.S. multinational firms hold more cash than U.S. 
domestic firms after recent financial crisis, and U.S. multinational firms hold more cash than 
foreign multinational firms since 1990, all of which cannot completely be explained by firm-
specific variables. Although they claim R&D intensity as the cause of cash holdings in U.S. 
multinational firms, there may be a set of variables critical to cash holdings behavior beside 
R&D since poor investment opportunity, regulation, and governance are proven to have no 
relation with cash holdings. Additionally, this paper can be expanded by applying the 
fluctuations in commodity prices as one of international macroeconomic uncertainties to 
explain cash holdings behavior. Cespedes and Velasco (2011, 2012) claim that commodity 
price shocks are transmitted to the economy through various different channels and confirm 
the response of macroeconomic variables in high commodity prices. Overall, cash holdings 
behavior could be explained better if firm-specific, macroeconomic, and international 
macroeconomic variables are simultaneously utilized. 
  
 97 
 
References 
 
Acharya, V.V., Almeida, H., Campello, M., Is cash negative debt? A hedging perspective on corporate 
financial policies, Journal of Financial Intermediation 16(4), 2007, 515-554. 
 
Almeida, H., Campello, M., Weisbach, M.S., The cash flow sensitivity of Cash, The Journal of 
Finance 59(4), 2004, 1777-1804. 
 
Antonakakis, Nikolaos, Ioannis Chatziantoniou, and George Filis., Dynamic co-movements of stock 
market returns, implied volatility and policy uncertainty, Economics Letters 120.1, 2013, 87-92. 
 
Baker, Scott, Nicholas Bloom, and Steven Davis., Measuring Economic Policy Uncertainty., Working 
Paper, 2011 
 
Bates, T., Kahle, K., Stulz, R.M., Why do US firms hold so much more cash than they used to?, 
Journal of Finance 64 (5), 2009, 1985-2021. 
 
Bansal, R., Dittmar, R.F., Lundblad, C.T., Consumption, Dividends, and the cross section of equity 
returns, The Journal of Finance 60(4), 2005, 1639-1672. 
 
Baum , C. F. , Caglayan,  M., Ozkan, N.,  Talavera , O., The impact of macroeconomic uncertainty 
on non-financial firms' demand for liquidity, Review of Financial Economics 15(4), 2006, 289-304  
 
Bloom, Nicholas., The Impact of Uncertainty Shocks, Econometrica, Vol.77, May 2009, 623-685.  
Bloom, Nick, Stephen Bond, and John Van Reenen, Uncertainty and Investment Dynamics, Review of 
Economic Studies, 74, 2007, 391-415. 
 
Céspedes, Luis Felipe, and Andrés Velasco, Macroeconomic Performance During Commodity Price 
Booms and Busts, IMF Economic Review 60.4, 2012, 570-599. 
 
Chen, Naiwei, and Arvind Mahajan, Effects of Macroeconomic Conditions on Corporate Liquidity—
International Evidence, International Research Journal of Finance and Economics 35, 2010, 112-129. 
 
Crowley, Patrick and Habibdoust, A., Assessing the exchange rate exposure of US multinationals, 
Working paper series, 2013 
 
Dekle, R. and Ryoo, H., Exchange rate fluctuations, financing constraints, hedging, and exports: 
Evidence from firm level data, Journal of International Financial Markets, Institutions and Money 17, 
2007, 437–451. 
 
Denis, D.J., Sibilkov, V., Financial constraints, investment, and the value of cash holdings, The 
Review of Financial Studies 23(1), 2010, 247-269. 
 
Diebold, Francis X., and Kamil Yilmaz, Macroeconomic volatility and stock market volatility, 
worldwide, No. w14269. National Bureau of Economic Research, 2008. 
 
Dittmar, A.K., and Duchin, R., The concentration of cash: Cash policies of the richest firms, 
University of Michigan working paper. 2012 
 
Dittmar, Amy K., Mahrt-Smith, J., Corporate governance and the value of cash holdings, Journal of 
Financial Economics 83 (3), 2007, 599-634. 
 
 98 
 
Dittmar, A.K., Mahrt-Smith, J., Servaes, H., International corporate governance and corporate cash 
holdings, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 38 (1), 2003, 111-133. 
 
Duchin, R., Cash holdings and corporate diversification, Journal of Finance 65 (3), 2010, 955-992. 
 
Farre-Mensa, J., Comparing the cash policies of public and private firms, Harvard University working 
paper. 2012 
 
Foley, F., Hartzell, J., Titman, S., Twite, G., Why do firms hold so much cash? A tax-based 
explanation, Journal of Financial Economics 86 (3), 2007, 579-607. 
 
Gande, Amar, Christoph Schenzler, and Lemma W. Senbet, Valuation effects of global diversification, 
Journal of International Business Studies 40.9 (2009): 1515-1532. 
 
Gao, H., Harford, J., and Li, K., Determinants of Corporate Cash Policy: Insights from Private Firms, 
Forthcoming in Journal of Financial Economics. 2013 
 
Gao, Janet, and Yaniv Grinstein, Firms’ Cash holdingss, Precautionary Motives, and Systematic 
Uncertainty, Available at SSRN 2478349, 2014. 
 
Guillou, Sarah, and Stefano Schiavo, Exchange rate exposure under liquidity constraints, Industrial 
and Corporate Change (2014): dtu033. 
 
Guo, Rong, What drives firms to be more diversified?, Journal of Finance & Accountancy 6, 2011. 
 
Hackbarth, D., J. Miao and E. Morellec, Capital structure, credit risk, and macroeconomic conditions, 
Journal of Financial Economics 82, 2006, pp. 519–550 
 
Han, S., Qiu, J., Corporate precautionary cash holdings, Journal of Corporate Finance 13(1), 2007, 
43-57. 
 
Harford, J., Mansi, S., Maxwell, W., Corporate governance and firm cash holdings in the US, Journal 
of Financial Economics 87 (3), 2008, 535-555. 
 
Irvine, P.J., Pontiff, J.E., Idiosyncratic return volatility, cash flows, and product market competition, 
Review or Financial Studies 22(3), 2008, 1149-1177. 
 
Jensen, M., Agency costs of free cash flow, corporate finance, and takeovers, American Economic 
Review 76 (2), 1986, 323-329. 
 
Jorion, P., The Exchange-Rate Exposure of U.S. Multinationals, Journal of Business, July, 1990, 331-
345.  
 
Jurado, Kyle, Sydney C. Ludvigson, and Serena Ng, Measuring uncertainty, No. w19456. National 
Bureau of Economic Research, 2013. 
 
Keynes, J.M., The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money, Macmillan Cambridge 
University Press. 1936 
 
Khurana, I.K., Martin, X., Pereira, R., Financial Development and the cash flow sensitivity of cash, 
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 41(4), 2006, 787-807. 
 
 99 
 
Kim, C.-S., Mauer, D.C., Sherman, A.E., The determinants of corporate liquidity: Theory and 
evidence, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 33 (3), 1998, 335-359. 
 
Lee, Youngjoo, and Kyojik Song, Financial crisis and corporate cash holdings: Evidence from East 
Asian Firms, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 2012. 
 
Lins, K.V., Servaes, H., Tufano, P., What drives corporate liquidity? An international survey of cash 
holdings and lines of credit, Journal of Financial Economics 98 (1), 2010, 160-176. 
 
Miller, M.H., Orr, D., A model of the demand for money by firms, Quarterly Journal of Economics 80 
(3), 1966, 413-435. 
 
Nasseh, Alireza, and Jack Strauss, Stock prices and domestic and international macroeconomic 
activity: a cointegration approach, The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance 40.2, 2000, 229-
245. 
 
Nielsen, Lynge, Classification of countries based on their level of development: How it is done and 
how it could be done,  IMF Working Paper Series, 2011  
 
Opler, T., Pinkowitz, L., Stulz, R.M., Williamson, R., The determinants and implications of corporate 
holdings of liquid assets, Journal of Financial Economics 52 (1), 1999,  
 
Palazzo, B., Cash holdings, risk, and expected returns, Journal of Financial Economics 104(1), 2012, 
162-185. 
 
Ramirez, A., Tadesse, S., Corporate Cash holdingss, National Culture, and Multinationality, William 
Davidson Institute Working Paper Number 876, 2007 
 
Subramaniam, V., Tang, T., Yue, H., Zhou, X., Firm structure and corporate cash holdings, Journal of 
Corporate Finance 17(3), 2011, 759-773. 
 
Pinkowitz, Lee, Rene Stulz, and Rohan Williamson, Multinationals and the High Cash holdingss 
Puzzle, Working Paper, 2012.  
 
Taylor, Stephen, Pradeep Yadav, and Yuanyuan Zhang, The Information Content of Implied 
Volatilities and Model-Free Volatility Expectations: Evidence from Options Written on Individual 
Stocks, Journal of Banking & Financing 34, 2010, 871-881.  
 
Tong, Zhenxu, Firm diversification and the value of corporate cash holdings, Journal of Corporate 
Finance, 17(3), 2011, 741-758. 
 
Zakaria, Zukarnain, and Sofian Shamsuddin, Empirical evidence on the relationship between stock 
market volatility and macroeconomics volatility in Malaysia, Journal of Business Studies Quarterly 
4.2. 2012, 61. 
  
 100 
 
VITA 
 
The author was born in Yeosu, S. Korea. After working as a portfolio manager at an asset investment 
management company in Seoul, S. Korea, he came to the United States to pursue his career in finance. 
He obtained his M.S. degree in finance from Mississippi State University in 2004 and his M.A. degree 
in economics from The University of Kansas in 2011. Along with degrees in master level, he worked 
as a business consultant for several years. In 2011, he joined University of New Orleans graduate 
program to pursue a PhD in financial economics. After completing coursework and passing the 
doctoral general exam, he has been instructing students for finance and economics coursework since 
2013.  
